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INTRODUCTION
Once described as the most successful program of the modern welfare
state,1 social security2 has a long-term future that is now in doubt. The Board
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. A.B., 1983, Univer-
sity of Michigan; J.D., 1988, Cornell Law School.
The author is grateful to Richard Ausness, Merton C. Bernstein, Alvin Goldman, Robert
Moore, John Rogers, Paul Salamanca, David Shipley, and Harold Weinberg for their comments
on earlier drafts and to Lesley Mentzer, Carol Parris, Stacie Turner, and Jeffrey Wilder for their
research assistance.
1. Paul Samuelson, Social Security, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1967, at 88. Even today, most
Americans are impressed favorably with social security. Martynas A. Ycas, The Issue Un-
resolved: Innovating and Adapting Disability Programs for the Third Era of Social Security, 58
Soc. SECURITY BULL. 48, 49 (1995); see also authorities cited in infra note 22.
2. For purposes of this article, the term social security will be used in its generally accepted
manner as referring only to the cash benefits provided by the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance ("OASDI") program. The Old-Age Survivors Insurance ("OASI") program provides
benefits for retired workers and their spouses and children and to survivors of deceased workers.
The Disability Insurance ("DI") program provides benefits for disabled workers and their
spouses and children and pays for rehabilitation services for the disabled. Ycas, supra note 1, at
49. For a discussion of other possible definitions of the term social security, see ROBERT M.
BALL, SOCIAL SECURITY TODAY AND TOMORROW 1-4 (1978), and ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL
SECURITY 5-6 (4th ed. 1993). See also ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SO-
CIAL SECURITY 3-6 (1966) (discussing history of use of term "social security" in the United
States); WILBUR J. COHEN & MILTON FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: UNIVERSAL OR SELEC-
TIVE? 6 (1972) (noting the term social security "expresses, at the same time, a program, an aspi-
ration, and an evolving complex of social institutions and attitudes"); EDWIN E. WITrE, SOCIAL
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Disability and Insurance
(OASDI) Trust Funds predicts that unless corrective action is taken, social
security benefit payments will exceed dedicated tax revenues by the year
2013, and the social security program will become insolvent - unable to pay
promised benefits in full - by the year 2029.3
As a result of this dire prediction, proposals to reshape the social secur-
ity system abound. Among the most popular of these proposals are sugges-
tions that the social security system be privatized.4 Once viewed as a fairly
radical recommendation, policymakers are now seriously considering
privatization. 5
Although the privatization proposals vary widely in their details, they
share certain common foundations. Among those foundations is a require-
ment that workers invest a portion of their social security contributions in
one or more private funds. Benefits then are based on the amount invested
in the private fund or funds and the earnings and/or losses on those
investments.
In the current climate of a seemingly endless bull market, the proposals
may appear quite appealing. They offer workers the opportunity to earn
market rates of return on their social security contributions. The proposals,
however, are not a costless panacea to social security's long-term funding
problems. Rather, they suffer from both practical limitations and theoretical
problems.
First, on the practical side, the privatization proposals do not guarantee
that workers will do better than under the current system. Rather, they sub-
ject workers to investment risk. Workers might do better than under the
current system; on the other hand, they might do worse. In addition, the
SECURITY: A WILD DREAM OR A PRACTICAL PLAN?, ADDRESS TO THE WISCONSIN ALUMNI
INSTrrUTE (June 17, 1938), reprinted in EDWIN E. WrrrE, SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES 3-4
(Robert J. Lampman ed., 1962) (discussing potential breadth of term social security).
3. 1997 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS.
TR. FUNDS ANN. REP. 6, 29 (1997) [hereinafter BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP.]. For a more detailed
discussion of their predictions, see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
4. For purposes of this article, privatization will refer to proposals that involve individuals
directing their own accounts and bearing the risk of investing in the private market, and not to
proposals that involve the federal government investing in the private market and bearing the
risk. But see Bob Davis, A Consensus Emerges: U.S. Social Security Faces Major Makeover;
Advisory Panel Will Offer Three Overhaul Plans, All Turning to Markets; What if Feds Buy
Stocks?, WALL ST. J. EUR., 1996 WL-WSJE 1074018 (treating proposals in which federal govern-
ment invests in private market as privatization proposals); see also Proposals for Alternative
Investment of the Social Security Trust Fund Reserves: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (Oct. 4, 1994) [here-
inafter Proposals] (same). See generally NEW PALGRAVE DIcTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 976 (3d
ed. 1987) (defining privatization as "the transfer of assets or service functions from public to
private ownership or control"); Congress Unwilling to Consider Proposals Jeopardizing Current
Benefits Bunning Says, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1732, 1733 (July 28, 1997) (noting that Rep.
Jim Bunning commented that consensus has not been reached on meaning of privatization).
5. See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the social security priva-
tization proposals currently under consideration.
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privatization proposals inevitably impose transition costs as they shift from
our current system, which is predominantly funded on a pay-as-you-go basis,
to a funded system.
The privatization proposals also suffer from two significant theoretical
problems. First, they promote misguided paternalism by forcing workers to
save for retirement while subjecting them to investment risk. Second, they
misconceive the role social security should play in our national retirement
system.
This article begins by briefly describing the social security program. It
then discusses the reasons for social security's widespread popularity and its
impending funding crisis. The article goes on to briefly describe some of the
pending privatization proposals. The article concludes by discussing the
practical and theoretical problems with privatizing social security. Specifi-
cally, it describes the investment risk participants face under a privatized sys-
tem and the transition problems created by converting to such a system.
Finally, this article explains why the privatization proposals promote mis-
guided paternalism and misconceive the role social security should play in
our national retirement system.
I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
A little more than sixty years ago, America's economy was in tatters. By
1934, unemployment had risen to 21.7% while real GNP contracted by more
than 25% over the previous five years. Moreover, the stock market had
fallen by more than 70% in the five years ending 1933.6 "Americans were
frightened and they called for bold leadership. The Great Depression had set
the stage and President Roosevelt deftly took his cue."'7
On June 29, 1934, the President established the Committee on Economic
Security to "study problems relating to the economic security of individu-
als."8 Less than seven months later, the Committee issued a report recom-
mending, among other things, the establishment of an "old-age security
6. Proposals, supra note 4, at 139 (stating testimony of Willam G. Shipman, Principal, State
Street Global Advisors).
7. Id.; see also PHILIP BOOTH, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 7 (1973) ("There is little
doubt that the act would not have been adopted in 1935 except for acute public awareness of
widespread deprivation, dependency, and hopelessness during the Great Depression that con-
vinced the people and their representatives in Congress that government action was essential to
relieve the human distress caused by unemployment, old-age dependency, insecurity, and wide-
spread poverty."); J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 60 (1977) (stating that in
1935, "[clontributory social insurance, especially on a national basis, was a revolutionary idea.
Only a severe depression coupled with a President with exceptional political insight and influ-
ence could have caused it to be established."). See generally CAROLYN L. WEAVER, THE CRISIS
IN SOCIAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS 58-76 (1982) (discussing economic
and political changes leading to enactment of social security).
8. Exec. Order No. 6757 (June 29, 1934), reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON ECO-
NOMIC SECURITY OF 1935, AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 140 (50th Anniv. ed. 1985) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
CoMrIrEE].
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program"9 to help safeguard against "the major hazards and vicissitudes of
life." 10 Following in large part the Committee's recommendations," Con-
gress enacted the Social Security Act of 1935,12 which President Roosevelt
signed into law on August 14, 1935.13
Social security's "old-age security program" began as a relatively small
and discrete program. 14 As originally enacted, it covered approximately 55%
of the civilian workforce, 15 provided limited monthly benefits solely to work-
ers,16 and delayed the commencement of the payment of benefits until Janu-
ary 1, 1942.17 Even before the benefits began, however, Congress
"completely revamped" 18 the program with the Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1939;19 it extended benefits to wives, widows, and children, substan-
tially increased benefits in the early years, and advanced the effective date
for payment of benefits to 1940.20
In the years since 1939, social security has grown slowly and inexorably21
into one of the country's largest and most successful social welfare pro-
9. Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, reprinted in REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 45, 25 (1985).
10. Id. at 45, 19 (quoting President Roosevelt's Message to Congress reviewing the Broad
Objectives and Accomplishments of the Administration of June 8, 1934).
11. Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Fifty Years Later, in RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 3, 7 ("In seven months the several proposals, with
some important changes, deletions and additions, were converted into a law whose two major
'social insurance' programs were upheld as constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court within two
years.").
12. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
13. 79 CONG. REC. 13078 (1935).
14. The Social Security Act of 1935 was not limited to the establishment of an old age
security program. It contained, among other things, grants to states for unemployment compen-
sation administration, aid to dependent children, and maternal and child welfare. Pub. L. No.
74-271, tits. III-V, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). As discussed in supra note 2, however, this article will
focus on social security's OASDI program.
15. As of 1939, the social security system covered 55.1% of the civilian workforce.
CHARLES M. BRAIN, SOCIAL SECURITY AT THE CROSSROADS 49 tbl.3-5 (1991).
16. In addition, certain workers over 65 or their estates were to receive lump sum payments.
Id. at 38 & n.9.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Robert M. Ball, The 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act and What Followed, in
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE, supra note 8, at 161, 162.
19. Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1360 (1939).
20. Id. at 1362-78. The 1939 Amendments also converted the system from a system funded
by a large reserve account to a "pay-as-you-go" system with a partial reserve. Alan Pifer &
Forrest Chisman, Foreword to REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at v, xi. For a more
detailed discussion of the 1939 Amendments, see WEAVER, supra note 7, at 115-24.
21. For an excellent discussion of the reasons for social security's slow, steady, and almost
controversy-free growth, see MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
(1979). For an excellent discussion of the early history of the Social Security Act, see ALT-
MEYER, supra note 2, at 3-118. For a fairly lengthy discussion of amendments to the Act over the
years, see WEAVER, supra note 7, at 115-72. For briefer discussions of amendments to the Act,
see BRAIN, supra note 15, at 37-97; Ball, supra note 18, at 167-72; and Marilyn E. Manser, His-
torical and Political Issues in Social Security Financing, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 21, 23-
29 (Felicity Skidmore ed., 1981).
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grams.22 In 1995, the program covered approximately 141 million workers, 23
or about 96% of all workers in paid employment 24 and paid benefits totalling
$332.6 billion to 43.4 million beneficiaries.25 This included more than twenty-
six million retired workers receiving survivor benefits averaging $720 per
month, more than five million widows and widowers receiving benefits aver-
aging $680 per month, and more than four million disabled workers receiving
benefits averaging $682 per month.2 6
This section briefly describes the social security program of today. It
then explains why the program has achieved such popularity and why it faces
a funding crisis beginning early next century.
22. See ALTMEYER, supra note 2, at 263 (noting that in 1954, President Eisenhower, a Re-
publican, called contributory old age, survivors', and disability benefits system "the cornerstone
of Government's programs to promote the economic security of the individual"); BALL, supra
note 2, at vii (stating in the foreword, Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin declared, "[slocial
security is our most successful program of social reform"); BRAIN, supra note 15, at 227 ("[T]he
social security program has received overwhelming support in its fifty-five year history.");
DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 4 ("The great popularity of social security has been one of the
axioms of American public life."); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPEC-
TIVES FOR REFORM 1 (1968) ("The social security system is among the most effective and suc-
cessful institutions ever developed in the United States"); Herman B. Leonard, In God We Trust
- The Political Economy of the Social Security Reserves, in SOCIAL SECURITY'S LOOMING SUR-
PLUSES: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 57, 59 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1990) [hereinafter LOOM-
ING SURPLUSES] (noting social security enjoys nearly unassailable political support); Bruce K.
MacLaury, Foreword, in MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT at vii (1990) (noting social security is no less
sacred politically today than in 1979); Pifer & Chisman, supra note 20, at xiii ("Whatever its
faults, the Social Security Act is by many measures the single most successful piece of domestic
legislation ever created in the United States."); Felicity Skidmore, Introduction to SOCIAL SE-
CURrrY FINANCING, supra note 21, at 7-8 ("That social security was one of the most popular
social programs was accepted without question.").
23. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1996 ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 14 (1996) [hereinafter ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT].
24. Id. at 30. Excluded workers fall into five principal categories: (1) federal civilian em-
ployees hired before January 1, 1984; (2) railroad workers (who are covered by a retirement
system that is coordinated with social security); (3) certain state and local government employ-
ees who are covered by a retirement system; (4) household workers and farm workers whose
earnings are below a minimum amount; and (5) individuals with very low net earnings from self-
employment. Id. The 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security recommended that cover-
age be extended to state and local government employees. 1994-96 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT VOL. I: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19-20 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I]. In addition, some, but not all, members of the Presi-
dent's Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform also have suggested that
coverage be extended to state and local government employees. 1995 BIPARTISAN COMM'N FI-
NAL REP. ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM, at 28, 38, 82, 227 [hereinafter BIPARTISAN
COMM'N FINAL REP.].
25. ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at 14-15. These figures refer to the
combined old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program.
26. Id. at 14.
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A. Social Security Today
Social security is a nationwide, federally-administered, compulsory, con-
tributory, defined benefit retirement program that historically has been
funded on a predominantly pay-as-you-go basis. The national, rather than
state-by-state, character of social security is one of the basic principles form-
ing the foundation of the system.2 7 Unlike unemployment benefits and
workers' compensation, social security applies in an identical manner
throughout the United States. A single federal agency, the Social Security
Administration, 28 administers social security benefits in an extremely effi-
cient manner.29
Participation in social security is mandatory. 30 "Social security requires
that all workers - provident and improvident alike - contribute to their
future security."31 The compulsory nature of social security serves a number
of purposes. First, it permits the program to redistribute protection from the
higher-paid to the lower-paid. 32 In addition, it prevents the problem of ad-
27. BOOTH, supra note 7, at 10; DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 21; see also J. DOUGLAS
BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY: EVOLUTION AND ISSUES 10 (1972)
(stating architects of social security were "convinced from the first that only an integrated, na-
tional system of old age insurance would be effective"); FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS REVIEWING THE BROAD OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION (June 8, 1934), reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 135, 138 ("Above
all, I am convinced that social insurance should be national in scope."). Actuaries advised
against a state-by-state system because of the mobility of American workers. ALTMEYER, supra
note 2, at 25.
28. Effective March 31, 1995, the Social Security Administration became an independent
agency. Social Security Independence and Program Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-269, 108
Stat. 1464 (1994). Prior to that time, the Social Security Administration was a part of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services. ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 23, at
28. That social security should be run by the federal government was one of the first principles
of social security upon which the executive leaders agreed. DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 21.
29. In 1996, administrative expenses for the OASDI program were approximately 0.9% of
benefit payments. BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 9; see also DERTHICK, supra note
21, at 5 (noting administration consumed only 2.2% of social security revenues).
The Social Security Administration is much more efficient in administering old-age benefits
than in administering the supplemental security income program and disability benefits. See
MERTON C. BERNSTEIN & JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTEIN, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE SYSTEM THAT
WORKS 13 (1988) ("While the Social Security cash program (for retirees, survivors, the disabled
and their families) incur slightly more than 1 percent of payments for administrative expenses,
Supplemental Security Income, which pays benefits to a comparable population but on a needs-
tested basis, costs 7.05% to operate."). See generally DERTHICK, supra note 21, for a discussion
of the Social Security's Administration's ability to implement its programs.
30. The compulsory nature of social security is another of the basic principles on which the
system was founded. BooTH, supra note 7, at 10; DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 21.
31. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15.
32. Id. As discussed below, the benefit formula is designed so that low-wage workers re-
ceive a higher proportion of their pre-retirement earnings than do high-wage workers. See
Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations,
40 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1987) (showing lower-income workers earn greater internal rates of return
than higher-income workers within cohorts); see also infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the calculation of Social Security benefits.
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verse selection that would occur if individuals could decide whether, and to
what extent, they wanted to participate in social security.33 Finally, compul-
sion reduces the need for public assistance by requiring the improvident to
pay their share of their future retirement needs.34
Social security is a "contributory" system; that is, it is funded by "contri-
butions," or payroll taxes imposed on employers and employees. 35 The Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act 36  requires that employers 37  and
employees 38 each "contribute" 6.2% of wages, 39 up to a maximum taxable
wage base that is indexed for inflation,40 to fund old-age survivor and disabil-
ity insurance benefits. 4 1 As noted above, the "contributions" are mandatory;
the payroll taxes must be paid for all covered employment. Employers and
employees cannot opt out of the system.
Social security is a defined benefit 4 2 retirement program under which
the government promises to provide participants specific benefits based on
33. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15; BRAIN, supra note 15, at 31;
see also Alan S. Blinder, Why is the Government in the Pension Business?, in SOCIAL SECURITY
AND PRIVATE PENSIONS: PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17, 19-
21 (Susan M. Wachter ed., 1988) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS] (criti-
quing failure of private annuity market justification for compulsory participation in social
security).
34. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15; see also Report to the Presi-
dent of the Committee on Economic Security, supra note 9, at 45, 33 ("[O]ld-age annuities are
designed to prevent destitution and dependency. Destitution and dependency are enormously
expensive, not only in the initial costs of necessary assistance but in the disastrous psychological
effect of relief upon the recipients, which, in turn, breeds more dependency.").
Some may argue that the lower-paid should not be required to contribute to social security
because they have more pressing current needs while others may respond that all people - no
matter their level of income - should be required to do something for their own future eco-
nomic security. Cf PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 280
(1980) (objecting to governmental paternalism because it restricts individuals' freedom to con-
trol their own lives); compare ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 93
(1977) (supporting view that lower-paid people should not be required to contribute), with MY-
ERS, supra note 2, at 505 (advocating view that all people should be required to contribute). See
generally Part III.C.
35. The "contributory" nature of the program is another of the first principles on which the
system was based. DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 21. For a more in-depth discussion of the philos-
ophy and effect of the "contributory" nature of the system, see infra notes 62-69 and accompany-
ing text.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 3101-3124 (1994). The self-employed are required to make similar "contri-
butions." 26 U.S.C. § 1401-1403.
37. 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a).
39. The OASI program receives 5.35% of the tax while 0.85% is allocated to the DI pro-
gram. BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 34-35.
40. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1). The maximum taxable wage base is $65,400 in 1997. 59 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 70 (1996). For a table listing the taxable wage base for each year from 1937
through 1997, see BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 34-35, tbl.II.B1.
41. The Act also requires that employers and employees contribute 1.45% of wages to fund
hospital insurance, namely Medicare. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b).
42. There are two basic types of retirement plans: defined benefit and defined contribution
plans. Defined benefit plans are plans in which the benefit is expressed as a certain amount that
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past earnings. 43 To calculate retirement benefits, the government begins by
determining the number of years upon which to base benefits. 44 Currently,
for all participants born after 1928 and retiring in 1991 or later, the base is
thirty-five years.45 Earnings are then indexed for inflation. 46 The govern-
ment calculates average adjusted earnings, or "average indexed monthly
earnings" (AIME) by taking the best thirty-five years of earnings, 47 adding
them together and dividing by 42048 (the number of months in thirty-five
years). 49 It then multiplies average adjusted earnings by a progressive bene-
fit formula to determine the "primary insurance amount" (PIA).
The PIA determines how much of the average adjusted earnings should
be replaced. Specifically, in 1997, the progressive formula was "90% of the
is to be paid at the employee's retirement. Such plans generally provide that a fixed amount per
month will be paid for the life of the retired employee and spouse. The amount is based upon a
formula which often takes into account the employee's years of service and salary. Plan assets
are pooled together to meet the aggregate demands of all plan participants and the participants
are protected against investment risk.
Defined contribution plans, in contrast, do not promise a specific benefit at retirement. In-
stead, benefits are based upon employer contributions to the plan. The employer contributes a
specific amount to each individual account established on behalf of each participant. The ac-
count is credited not only with the employer's contributions but also with earnings and losses.
Upon retirement, the participant is entitled to the amount held in the account, rather than any
fixed amount. Thus, the participant, rather than the employer, is subject to investment risk. See
generally 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT VOL. II: REPORTS OF
THE TECHNICAL PANEL ON TRENDS AND ISSUES IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS, TECHNICAL PANEL
ON ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS AND PRESENTATIONS TO COUNCIL 33-36 (1997) [hereinafter
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. 1I]; ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 75-79 (1991); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 41-43 (2d ed. 1995).
43. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL I, supra note 24, at 15.
44. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENE-
FIrrs (1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS]. Disability benefits are calculated in a
similar manner, but fewer years may be taken into account. See EUGENE C. STEUERLE & JON
M. BAKUA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG AP-
PROACHES TO REFORM 84-85 (1994).
45. UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS, supra note 44, at 11. For those born in 1928 or earlier,
there are fewer years in the base. Id. The 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council recom-
mended that the base be extended to 38 years. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note
24, at 20.
46. All individuals who reach 65 after 1983 must index their earnings. Individuals who
reached age 62 before 1979 may not index their earnings, and individuals who reached age 62
after 1979 but before 1984 may, but are not required to, index their earnings. 2A Soc. SECURITY
L. & PRAC. 22:5-7 (1987).
To index earnings, "each year's wage is multiplied by an 'indexing factor,' which equals the
ratio of the average national wage in the year the worker turns 60 to the average national wage
in the year to be indexed. For administrative convenience, wages earned at age 60 or later are
left at their nominal values in the indexing process." STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 44, at 76.
47. For individuals born before 1928, fewer than 35 years will be taken into account. See
supra note 45.
48. Again, for individuals born in 1928 or earlier, fewer months will be taken into account.
Id.
49. For a discussion of the advantages of using average earnings, see BROWN, supra note 7,
at 21-23.
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first $455 of AIME, plus 32% of AIME [between $455 and $2,741], plus 15%
of AIME [above] $2,741." 50 Thus, according to the formula, as a person's
average earnings increase, the percentage of adjusted average earnings that
are replaced decreases. Consequently, the ratio of benefits to average earn-
ings is higher for those with low average earnings than for those with high
average earnings. 5 1
As originally enacted, social security provided for the creation of a sub-
stantial reserve 52 to fund future social security benefits. 53 The creation of
such a reserve, however, was widely criticized.54 In 1939, Congress amended
the program to increase benefits to the first generation of retirees and thus
eliminated the creation of a significant reserve. 55 As a result of the 1939
amendment, social security shifted from a reserve system essentially to a pay-
as-you-go system where current revenues funded current benefits. 56 From
1939 to 1977, social security was financed principally on a pay-as-you-go ba-
sis. 57 In 1977, and again in 1983, Congress amended social security to move
50. BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 69. For a more detailed discussion on how
to calculate social security benefits, see STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 44, at 75-83. See also
BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 68-71 (showing values for program amounts that are
subject to automatic adjustment).
51. Social security's replacement rates - that is, the ratio of retirement benefits to final
wages - are relatively high for low-wage earners because it is expected that they will
have less help from private pensions and individual saving. Replacement rates are
lower for higher paid workers who are more likely to be covered by employer pensions
and who are better able to save on their own.
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15.
52. The reserve was expected ultimately to reach $47 billion. BRAIN, supra note 15, at 56;
BROWN, supra note 27, at 179.
53. The reserve was to have accumulated because payroll tax revenues in the early years of
the system were expected to greatly exceed expenditures. DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 233. See
generally MYERS, supra note 2, at 375-78 (explaining why reserve develops).
54. See WrITE, supra note 2, at 8-10 (critiquing criticisms of reserve); Ball, supra note 18, at
163-64 (discussing controversy between those who favored reserve and those who favored pay-
as-you-go system); see, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 2324 (1937) (statement of S. Arthur H. Vandenberg)
("It is scarcely conceivable that rational men should propose such an unmanageable accumula-
tion of funds in one place in a democracy."); M. A. Linton, Speech, in REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS
AND SPEECHES 187, 187 (American Institute of Actuaries, Joint Meeting with Actuarial Society
of America 1938) ("Of all the features of our contributory old age insurance plan, none has been
under more severe and sustained attack than the one providing for the creation of a huge reserve
fund.").
55. As a result of the amendment, the early retirees received far more than they paid into
the system. MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 128; see also Pifer & Chisman, supra note 20, at xi ("In
broad terms, the thrust of the 1939 Amendments was twofold. First, in place of a large reserve
account for old-age benefits, the adoption of a 'pay as you go system' with a partial reserve
meant each generation would finance its parents' retirement out of current earnings.").
56. "A pay-as-you-go social security system is one in which annual revenues dedicated to
the system approximately equal annual expenditures." HENRY J. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL SECURITY 7 (1982). For a discussion of the difference between the operation of a
funded system and a pay-as-you-go system, see WEAVER, supra note 7, at 119-21.
57. Technically, until 1972, financing was on a contingency-fund basis. In 1972, Congress
amended social security to provide for financing on a pay-as-you-go basis. See MYERS, supra
note 2, at 386, 388 ("The 1939 Act changed the financing basis to what was generally believed to
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away from the pay-as-you-go system toward a system with temporary partial-
reserve financing where reserves built up for a few decades and then used to
pay for future benefits. 58 Thus, under the current system, most current reve-
nues are used to finance current benefits, but some current revenues are set
aside to fund future benefits. 5 9
B. Popularity of Social Security
Although many factors may contribute to social security's popularity,6°
two factors appear essential to the overwhelming popularity of the program.
First, social security's advocates have carefully packaged the program to gar-
ner support. Second, until now, social security has paid most participants far
more in benefits than they have contributed to the system.
1. Packaging the Program
Social security enjoys enormous political popularity because most par-
ticipants view the program as an insurance program to which they contribute
and from which they have a right to receive benefits. 6 1 The public's percep-
be a pay-as-you-go basis or, more properly a contingency-fund basis.... The 1972 Act... moved
the financing basis for the future to current-cost (or pay-as-you-go) from the previous modified-
reserve procedure. It is important to note that, in the past decade, the actual experience had
been close to current-cost financing."); see also AARON, supra note 56, at 7 ("Although it accu-
mulated a modest reserve in its early years and that reserve is now declining, the U.S. social
security system is essentially a pay-as-you-go system.").
58. See generally ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 16 ("As a result of
the 1977 and 1983 Social Security Amendments, the Social Security Trust Funds began to accu-
mulate some reserves ... in advance of the sharply rising retirement costs of the baby boom
generation."); MYERS, supra note 2, at 390 ("The 1977 Act - perhaps unintentionally -
changed the financing basis from pay-as-you-go to the hybrid one of temporary partial-reserve
funding, by intending to build up a mammoth fund over a period of years and then liquidating
it.... The 1983 Act did not change the financing basis, but rather exacerbated it by producing
even larger fund buildup in the next few decades."); Barry P. Bosworth, Fund Accumulation:
How Much? How Managed?, in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE? 89, 101
(Peter A. Diamond et al. eds., 1996) ("With the 1977 and 1983 amendments, Congress began to
move away from a pay-as-you-go system of financing, toward a greater emphasis on the adjust-
ment of taxes and promised benefit levels to maintain an actuarial balance between future costs
and future income.").
59. At present, approximately $500 billion has been set aside to pay for future benefits.
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 16.
60. Other factors, such as the efficiency with which the program has been administered, also
may help to account for its popularity. See BRAIN, supra note 15, at 198 (attributing support of
social security to "belief that society as a whole benefits from the social security program and the
view that social security beneficiaries have no alternative sources of income"). See generally
DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 5 (noting Robert M. Ball's claims that social security has been
"proved highly acceptable and achieved revolutionary results for three reasons. First, it rests on
old, accepted principles - the virtues of work, self-help, and individual saving." Second, it has
been financed by "contributions" rather than general revenues. Third, it has been efficiently
administered.).
61. BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 14 ("The absence of a means test and the
view by most people that they earn their benefits are factors that undoubtedly account for the
enormous popularity of the system."); MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, Too MANY PROMISES: THE UNCER-
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tion of the program is not happenstance. Rather, the founders and propo-
nents of social security have cultivated this perception carefully over the
years.
The founders of the program decided to finance social security through
"contributions" or payroll taxes62 because they believed that such financing
would give participants a "right" to benefits and thus provide long-term sup-
port for the program.63 When asked by a reporter why the program was to
be financed through payroll taxes, President Franklin D. Roosevelt replied:
Those taxes were never a problem of economics. They are politics
all the way through. We put those payroll contributions there so as
to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect
their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes
in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security
program.6
4
TAIN FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 14 (1986) ("This illusion [that social security is analogous to
insurance] is no doubt one basis of the widespread popular support for the program."); BRAIN,
supra note 15, at 247 ("The concept of 'earned' benefit has been central to the support of the
program throughout its history."); Leonard, supra note 22, at 57, 59-60 ("What sustains the pro-
gram is the political fervor of millions of participants, a fervor born of their having made pay-
ments they view as contributions to an insurance program."); Manser, supra note 21, at 21, 34
("There is general agreement that the image of social security as a system of mandatory insur-
ance has played a major part in developing public support."); see also ALTMEYER, supra note 2,
at 263 (labelling social security as "insurance" and emphasizing that statutory right to benefits
did much to popularize program); Jill Quadagno, Interest-Group Politics and the Future of U.S.
Social Security, in STATES, LABOR MARKETS, AND THE FUTURE OF OLD-AGE POLICY 36-58
(John Myles & Jill Quadagno eds., 1991) (contending that social security owes its invincibility to
"middle class incorporation," fact that program provides benefits to all workers as matter of
right).
62. See supra notes 35-41 for a discussion of how contributions are calculated.
63. See COHEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 90 (statement of Wilbur J. Cohen) ("Require-
ment that both employee and employer contribute to the program has given political, psycholog-
ical, and legal reality to the right... [payroll taxes] safeguard the statutory benefit as a matter of
right."); DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 228 ("When policymakers considered how to pay the costs
of social security, more than a method of financing was at stake. The whole philosophy of the
program and the psychology of its public relations rested on the proposition that benefits were
earned through the 'contributions' of individual workers. Financing was more than a means to
an end. It was central."); Pifer & Chisman, supra note 20, at ix-x ("In [Roosevelt's] view, financ-
ing social security by a payroll tax would create a continuing political constituency for the pro-
gram, because it would give people the feeling they had earned and were entitled to their
benefits by virtue of a lifetime of payments. So far he has been proven right."); see also ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 95 ("The fact that workers pay earmarked
contributions from their wages into the system also reinforces the concept of an earned right and
gives contributors a moral claim on future benefits above and beyond statutory obligations.").
64. BRAIN, supra note 15, at 1 (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 308-09 (1958)). Similarly, in originally recommending that social security be fi-
nanced through payroll taxes, the Committee on Economic Security explained, "[c]ontributory
annuities are unquestionably preferable to noncontributory pensions. They come to the workers
as a right, whereas the noncontributory pensions must be conditioned upon a 'means' test."
Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, supra note 9, at 45, 25.
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Over the years, social security consistently and intentionally has been
referred to as insurance. 65 In fact, Congress named the program through
which social security benefits are funded the "Federal Insurance Contribu-
tions Act."'66 In its messages to the public, the Social Security Administra-
tion purposely has used the term "insurance" to secure public acceptance for
the program. 67 Although critics of the program long have challenged the use
of the word "insurance" to describe the program, 68 the general public contin-
ues to view the program as an insurance program through which they have a
right to benefits.69
2. Return on Contributions
Social security also owes much of its popularity to the fact that until now
nearly all social security participants have received far more in benefits than
65. Proposals, supra note 4, at 140 ("To reinforce the perception of security, insurance pa-
tois was substituted for accurate terminology .... The misuse of the words, employed in the
original legislation, continues to this day."); see also WEAVER, supra note 7, at 123-24 (discussing
use of insurance terminology to increase marketability of social security program).
66. 26 U.S.C. ch. 21 (1989) (italics added). Insurance terminology was built into the Social
Security program immediately after the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the program in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). See MYERS, supra note 2, at 13.
Prior to that decision, administrators were advised to play down use of the term "insurance."
WEAVER, supra note 7, at 109.
67. DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 199; see also ALTmEYER, supra note 2, at 263 ("[T]he
Social Security Board consistently throughout the years called the contributory old age, survi-
vors', and disability benefit system 'insurance."'); MYERS, supra note 2, at 15 ("[T]he Social
Security Board . . . very definitely overstressed the insurance concept in the early days of the
program. This was done primarily to build up and maintain public support for the social security
program-by drawing on the good name and reputation of private insurance.").
68. See MYERS, supra note 2, at 12-16 (defending use of term "insurance" to describe social
security); see, e.g., Proposals, supra note 4, at 140 (Testimony by William C. Shipman, Principal,
State Street Global Advisors); COHEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Milton
Friedman) ("The very name - old age and survivors insurance - is a blatant attempt to mislead
the public into identifying a compulsory tax and benefit system with private, voluntary, and
individual purchase of individually assured benefits."); FERRARA, supra note 34, at 66-67, 71-72
(challenging representation of social security as insurance program financed by contributions as
fraudulent); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 4 ("The differences [between social
security and private insurance] are significant, however, and [our] volume argues that the pres-
ent program is more appropriately viewed as a system of transfers which, like any other govern-
ment program, must be financed by taxes."); William G. Shipman, Why It's So Hard to Reform
Social Security, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 31, 1994, at 12 ("The three components of social
security . . . have little resemblance to private insurance even though the term is used
throughout.").
69. Shipman, supra note 68, at 12 ("The intentional misuse of terms has had the intended
effect. Most Americans favor the system. They believe they have 'contributed' to a retirement
fund where they have an account of assets."); see also Leonard, supra note 22, at 57-59 (noting
"armies of policy-oriented economists" unsuccessfully attempted to get everyone to see social
security as they see it, as a transfer program rather than insurance); Camilla E. Watson,
Machiavelli and the Politics of Welfare, National Health, and Old Age: A Comparative Perspective
of the Policies of the United States and Canada, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1337, 1359 n.113 (1993)
("Many people consider social security to be an "insurance policy.").
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they have paid in taxes. 70 These returns, or intergenerational transfers, 71 are
a natural result of social security's operation basically as an immature pay-as-
you-go system. 72 In a pay-as-you-go system, current contributions fund cur-
rent benefits. So long as the working population is stable, or growing vis-A-
vis the retired population, and the economy is growing, a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem can pay retirees benefits that exceed their contributions. 73 If, however,
real wages fall or the working population shrinks vis-A-vis the retired popula-
tion, a pay-as-you-go system may no longer be able to pay retirees benefits
that exceed their contributions.
74
70. See BOSKIN, supra note 61, at 35-37 & tbl.2.10 (noting internal rate of return for age
cohort reaching 65 by 1970 ranges from 9.7 to 7.5 and cohort reaching 65 by 1980 return ranges
from 6.6 to 5.6); ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 79 tbl.4-2 (1982)
(showing favorable tax-benefit ratios of hypothetical workers retiring in 1979); Richard V.
Burkhauser & Jennifer L. Warlick, Disentangling the Annuity from the Redistributive Aspects of
Social Security in the United States, 27 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 401, 402 (1981) (asserting past
near-unanimous support of social security may be attributable to fact that up to 1972 all income
classes were net gainers under program); James E. Duggan et al., Returns Paid to Early Social
Security Cohorts, XI CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 1 (1993) (stating 1895-1922 birth cohort received
aggregate real return of 9.1% annually); Michael D. Hurd & John B. Shoven, The Distributional
Impact of Social Security, in PENSIONS, LABOR, AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 193, 212 (David A.
Wise ed., 1985) (finding retirees who were between 58 and 64 in 1969 earned a real rate of return
of approximately 8%). See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
calculation of Social Security benefits.
71. See Blinder, supra note 33, at 24-26 (explaining how social security has transferred in-
come across generations). These intergenerational transfers are separate and distinct from the
intragenerational transfers explicitly intended by social security's progressive benefit formula.
See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text; see also Blinder, supra note 33, at 26-28 (explain-
ing how social security transfers income within generations).
72. AARON, supra note 56, at 41 (finding Social Security operates as immature pay-as-you-
go financing which provided excessive benefits to initial recipients); BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 29, at 235-36 (concluding that Social Security's excessive benefits to its initial partici-
pants are inevitable in any pay-as-you-go system); Alicia H. Munnell, Comment [on World Bank
Study], in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE?, supra note 58, at 197 (emphasiz-
ing inevitability that first generation does well in pay-as-you-go system).
73. If the population and tax rate remain constant over time, retirees will receive a return
on their contributions equal to the growth in real wages. The following formula explains this
phenomenon. Assume that w is the average covered money wage, W is the number of covered
workers, R is the number of retirees drawing benefits, and t is the payroll tax rate. A total of
twW will be paid into the system, which can finance an average benefit payment of tw(W/R). In
a stable population, W/R will be constant over time. Thus, a fixed payroll tax rate will be able to
finance benefits equal to a fixed percentage of average wages. If the working population vis-A-
vis the retired population is growing and the tax rate remains the same over time, retirees will
receive a return on their contributions equal to the growth in population and real wages. Apply-
ing the preceding formula, in a growing population, W/R will increase over time. Thus, a fixed
payroll tax rate will be able to finance benefits equal to an increasing percentage of average
wages. See Blinder, supra note 33, at 21; see also MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 127-28; Henry J.
Aaron, The Social Insurance Paradox, 32 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. ScI. 371-74 (Aug. 1966)
(showing that pay-as-you-go social insurance can increase the welfare of each person if the sum
of the rates of growth and real wages exceeds the rate of interest).
74. Applying the preceding formula, in a shrinking population, W/R will decrease over time
unless real wages generate adequately larger contributions. Thus, a fixed payroll tax rate will
only be able to finance benefits equal to a decreasing percentage of average wages.
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In 1939, Congress expressly decided to convert social security to a pay-
as-you-go system75 because it permitted Congress to pay the first generation
of retirees more than they paid into the system.76 Because Congress decided
to operate the system on a pay-as-you-go basis instead of limiting benefits to
the actuarial equivalent of contributions, the program was able to provide the
first generation of participants with "reasonably adequate" benefits. 77
Social security has continued to provide participants with benefits that
greatly exceed their contributions by continually increasing benefits 78 and ex-
tending coverage 79 to additional portions of the workforce. 80
75. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the fund-
ing of the social security system.
76. See ALTMEYER, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that technical staff presented plan that per-
mitted reasonably adequate benefits to be paid to workers reaching retirement age in early years
of the program by "using some of the current receipts to pay the cost in excess of the contribu-
tions which had been paid on behalf of these workers."); FINAL REPORT OF 1937-1938 ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, reprinted in REPORT TO THE COMMITEE, supra note 8, at
173, 187 ("The policy of paying higher benefits to persons retiring in the earlier years of the
system than are the equivalent of the individual contributions is already established in the pres-
ent act. Such a policy is not only sound social insurance practice but has long been recognized as
necessary in private pension programs. Only through the payment of reasonable benefits can
older workers be retired."); see also Richard A. Musgrave, A Reappraisal of Financing Social
Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING, supra note 21, at 89, 97 (observing two reasons given
for conversion from funded system to pay-as-you-go system: (1) "it seemed unacceptable to ex-
clude the then old generation from benefits;" and (2) "the 1937 recession, which followed rapidly
upon the introduction of the system, rendered a substantial system surplus undesirable on
grounds of stabilization policy.").
77. BALL, supra note 2, at 110 ("To make the program quickly effective, relatively high
benefits compared to contributions have been paid to those who worked under the program just
long enough to meet quite minimum eligibility requirements."); BROWN, supra note 27, at 97-98
("To provide a reasonable level of benefits for those retiring in the early years of the system
would require paying far more in benefits to the retired than the worker and his employer had
contributed."); STEURLE & BAKIJA, supra note 44, at 16 (asserting system crafted to transfer
large amounts to first generation of retirees because no one retiring during the first few decades
of the program would have contributed enough years to finance even a modest pension); Barry
Bosworth, Long-Term Social Security Financing, in ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. II, supra
note 42, at 398 ("Creating a funded system would have required, say 30 years, for a sufficient
retirement fund to be built up.").
78. Under a pay-as-you go system, increasing benefit levels permits current participants to
receive benefits that exceed their contributions because they do not need to pay throughout
their working lives the higher taxes required for the increased benefits. WEAVER, supra note 7,
at 122. See generally James M. Buchanan, The Budgetary Politics of Social Security, in LOOMING
SURPLUSES, supra note 22, at 45, 53 ("Throughout most of the history of social security, benefits
have increased well beyond the limits justified by actuarial standards."); Carolyn L. Weaver,
Controlling the Risks Posed by Advance Funding - Options for Reform, in LOOMING SURPLUSES,
supra note 22, at 170 ("Over the years, Congress has routinely increased benefits and met part of
the cost by depleting reserves.").
79. Under a pay-as-you-go system, extending coverage permits current participants to re-
ceive benefits that exceed their contributions because benefits payable vary directly with the
number of people subject to the tax and the tax rate necessary to finance any given level of
benefits varies inversely with the number of people subject to the tax. WEAVER, supra note 7, at
122, 127-28.
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C. The Impending Funding Crisis8 1
The days of paying participants benefits that greatly exceed their contri-
butions, however, are coming to a close. 82 First, Congress may no longer rely
on extending coverage to fund increasing benefits. Social security already
covers 96% percent of the working population; thus, there is little room left
for expansion.83 Second, Congress may no longer increase benefits without
increasing tax rates to an unacceptable level.84 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the United States faces an aging population, that is, an increasing per-
centage of its population is sixty-five or older.85
Initially, social security covered only workers in business and industry. Over the years, the
program has expanded to include "the self-employed, nonprofit groups, agricultural and house-
hold workers, the Armed Services, the Congress, and all other Federal employees hired after
1983." ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 19. The 1994-1996 Advisory
Council recommended that coverage be extended to all state and local government employees
hired after 1997. Id. at 25, 29, 32. See also infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for a de-
scription of coverage under the current system.
80. BOsKIN, supra note 61, at 14 ("While the direct transfer from taxpayers to beneficiaries
is most obvious in the example of the very first group of retirees, a similar process is repeated
every time Social Security tax rates are increased or coverage extended."); Bosworth, supra note
58, at 89, 97 n.11 ("It has taken the U.S. a surprisingly long time to complete the transition
through the first generation, which receives benefits without having to pay for past retirees.");
Eugene C. Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAX NOTES
1763, 1767 (1994) ("Although lifetime benefits and taxes were both growing rapidly for each
successive cohort of retirees, benefits for new retirees over most of this period grew by a larger
amount than the taxes they had paid during their working lives."); see also Hurd & Shoven,
supra note 70, at 193 ("The excess of benefits over taxes for the presently retired is also due to
the generosity of Congress in the early 1970s. Between 1968 and 1974 benefits were raised at a
rate considerably higher than the rate of inflation.").
81. Some may argue that use of the word "crisis" is an overstatement. See, e.g., ADVISORY
COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 102, 131 (emphasizing that Social Security is not in
crisis and system needs only minimal changes); BIPARTISAN COMM'N FINAL REP., supra note 24,
at 110 (statement of Commissioner Thomas J. Downey); see also Program Should Not Be
Privatized As Pensions Grow Riskier, Lawmaker Says, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1616, 1617
(July 14, 1997) (noting that view of congressmen as to whether social security system is in crisis
largely divided along party lines).
82. See generally BIPARTISAN COMM'N FINAL REP., supra note 24, at 48 (statement of Com-
missioner Peter Peterson) ("In the past, entitlement reform has almost always rewarded the
earlier-born at the direct expense of the later-born. But the days when we could finance entitle-
ment windfalls to ourselves by shifting the costs to a more numerous and affluent rising genera-
tion are long gone.").
83. As discussed supra note 24, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council and some members of the
President's Bipartisan Commission have recommended that coverage be extended to state and
local government employees.
84. Steurele & Bakija, supra note 80, at 1770 (contending that "payroll tax rates would have
to rise astronomically if they were to continue to finance net subsidies for all participants, includ-
ing high-income persons").
85. The United Nations defines the age of a population by looking at the percentage of the
population that is sixty-five or older. Robert L. Brown, Social Security and Retirees: Two Views
of the Projections, in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE?, supra note 58, at 22.
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Because social security is financed principally on a pay-as-you-go basis,8 6
benefit payments to retirees are dependent on the tax revenues raised from
the working population.8 7 In 1996, there were approximately 3.3 workers for
every social security beneficiary. 88 Primarily because a generation with a
sharp decline in the birth rate followed the baby boom generation, 89 the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disa-
bility Trust Funds ("Trustees") predicts that the ratio of workers to benefi-
ciaries will decline significantly early next century.90 Using intermediate
assumptions,9 1 the Trustees predict that the number of workers per benefici-
ary will decline to 2.4:1 by 2020 and further fall to 2.0:1 by 2030.92
As a result of social security's traditional funding on a pay-as-you-go
basis and the country's aging population, participants in the coming years
may expect to receive very low or negative returns on their contributions, 93
and social security faces a long-term funding deficit. Again, using intermedi-
ate assumptions, the Trustees predict that social security benefit payments
86. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the fund-
ing of the social security system.
87. Id.
88. BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 21.
89. Increased longevity is also a factor in social security's long-term funding problems. Spe-
cifically, three factors shape the demographic equation: (1) the fertility rate, which determines
how many future workers will pay into the system; (2) life expectancy which determines how
long benefits must be paid over the lifetime of each beneficiary; and (3) immigration. See id. at
62-65.
90. Id. at 21, 123-24.
91. The Board of Trustees uses three sets of assumptions regarding future economic and
demographic trends in evaluating the financial and actuarial status of the OASDI program. The
three sets range from low cost to high cost. The Board of Trustees viewed the intermediate
assumptions as their "best estimates." Id. at 11. Policymakers traditionally use the intermediate
assumptions. Carolyn L. Weaver, Introduction, in LOOMING SURPLUSES, supra note 22, at 2; see
also ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. II, supra note 42, at 137, 141-43 (explaining use of
intermediate assumptions); BIPARTISAN COMM'N FINAL REP., supra note 24, at 259 (noting pro-
jections based on intermediate assumptions). But see id. at 122-44 (quoting Commissioner Peter
Peterson's contention that intermediate assumptions are too optimistic).
92. BOARD OF TRUSTEES REP., supra note 3, at 124. Lawrence H. Thompson notes that the
increased retiree to worker ratio constitutes a permanent shift in the projected age distribution
of our population and should not be viewed as a temporary phenomenon associated with the
aging of the baby boom population. Lawrence H. Thompson, Altering the Public/Private Mix of
Retirement Incomes, in SOCIAL SECURrIY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS, supra note 33, at 209, 210; see
also Michael J. Boskin, Comment, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS, supra note 33,
at 227 (agreeing with Thompson's characterization).
93. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 104 ("Under present law, the
average real rate of return on Social Security taxes is projected to fall to about 2% on average
for workers reaching age 65 in 2020, and to level out at I to 2% on average for younger workers
and future generations. This is substantially below the real return to private capital investment,
which is estimated to be on the order of 9.3% for society as a whole on a pre-tax basis, or 5.4%
net of corporate income taxes."); Steurle & Bakija, supra note 80, at 1770 ("Lifetime contribu-
tions begin to exceed lifetime benefits for high-wage single males retiring in the 1980s. Positive
net transfers are eliminated for high-/average wage two-earner couples retiring after the turn of
the century. [High-wage single workers and two-earner couples retiring in the 2020s and later
will face very large negative transfers (or positive net lifetime taxes) from the system.").
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will exceed dedicated tax revenues by the year 2013.9 4 The Trustees further
predict that beginning in 2019, expenses from social security will exceed in-
come, and by the year 2029, the reserve funds will be completely exhausted. 95
The Trustees predict that unless corrective action is taken, beginning in 2029
the program's revenues will only cover about three-fourths of the cost of
benefits.
96
Social security's long-term funding problems are hardly surprising.
97
They are the inevitable result of social security's traditional funding, on a
pay-as-you-go basis, and the aging of our population.98 Anticipating these
problems, the Committee on Economic Security predicted that over the long
run, the United States' population would age such that benefit payments
would ultimately exceed income.99 The 1937-38 Social Security Advisory
Council similarly warned of the impending demographic shift:
The planning of the old-age insurance program must take full ac-
count of the fact that, while disbursements for benefits are relatively
small in the early years of the program, far larger total disburse-
ments are inevitable in the future. No benefits should be promised
94. As discussed above, in 1977 and in 1983, Congress amended social security to move
toward a system with partial-reserve financing. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. As a
result of the 1977 and 1983 Amendments, the Trustees predict that revenues from social security
will exceed expenditures for the next two decades, and that income from taxes plus interest on
accumulated funds will continue to exceed expenses each year from 2013 until 2018. BOARD OF
TRUSTEEs ANN. REP., supra note 3, at 6, 25.
95. These figures refer to the combined OASDI program. See id.
96. Id. at 28.
97. But see Bosworth, supra note 77, at 398 ("Policymakers in the 1930s could not have
predicted the current economic and demographic trends that have created this financing
problem.").
98. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 12 ("[F]rom now on many young
workers and workers of future generations under present law will be paying over their working
lifetimes employee and employer taxes that add to considerably more than the present value of
their anticipated benefits. This is the inevitable result of a pay-as-you-go system such as the
United States has had, and an aging population."); WEAVER, supra note 7, at 121-22 ("As
demographics (and the insurance status of workers) inevitably changed so as to increase the
proportion of beneficiaries of workers, it was believed [by opponents of a pay-as-you-go system]
that the increase in tax rates ultimately required to buttress returns may well be politically
unsustainable.").
99. Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, supra note 9, at 33
("Benefit payments will be light in the early years, but will increase steadily until by 1965 they
will exceed the annual receipts."); see also ALTMEYER, supra note 22, at 29 ("On the afternoon
of January 16, after the President had already notified Congress that on the following day he
would present a special message on economic security, he sent for Miss Perkins. He said there
must be some mistake in a table which appeared in the report since he had not understood that a
large deficit to be met out of general revenues would develop in the old age insurance system
beginning in 1965. It is probable his attention had been called to this by the Secretary of the
Treasury. When informed that the table was correct, the President said the report must be
changed at least to the extent of indicating this plan was only one of several that Congress might
consider. He also directed that the committee proceed to develop, as soon as possible, a com-
pletely self-sustaining old age insurance system.").
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or implied which cannot be safely financed not only in the early
years of the program but when workers now young will be old.100
Despite these warnings, 101 over the years Congress has chosen to fund social
security principally on a pay-as-you-go basis. 102 As a result, social security
already has transferred large sums to retired individuals10 3 and today's work-
ers face the inevitable problems of a maturing pay-as-you-go system.l04
II. THE PRIVATIZATION SOLUTION
In recent years, a variety of individuals have begun to offer privatization
as a solution to social security's long-term funding problems. 0 5 Once viewed
100. See FINAL REPORT OF THE 1937-1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
supra note 76, at 199; id. at 184 (discussing steadily growing number of aged in country); see also
Edwin E. Witte, Old-Age Security in the Social Security Act, reprinted in WrrrE, supra note 2, at
130 ("In a country as wealthy as the United States, it might be possible to finance a national old-
age insurance system on a 'pay-as-you-go' (annual assessment) basis. It is very certain, however,
that the annual costs under such a plan would increase very rapidly, due to two factors: (a) the
rapid increase in the number of old people, and (b) the fact that, on the average, men retired at
age 65 live twelve years thereafter and women fifteen years. This phenomenon of rapidly in-
creasing costs has characterized every retirement system ever established and will, undoubtedly,
also occur in the national old-age insurance system.").
Similarly, in the early years of its existence, the Social Security Board warned that without a
funded system, "[iut would be possible for succeeding generations to meet obligations accruing
through this early period only by means of a much higher tax rate than the maximum in the
present law, or by a large government subsidy." WEAVER, supra note 7, at 114-15 (quoting 1936-
37 U.S. SOC. SECURITY BD. ANN. REP. 23).
101. See 96 CONG. REC. H12666-68 (1950) (objection of Rep. Byrnes of Wisconsin) (oppos-
ing immorality of binding future generations to pay for benefit increases paid to current retir-
ees); Robert J. Myers, Social Security's Hidden Hazards, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1972, at 8
(reporting former chief actuary of the Social Security Administration objects to increase in bene-
fits because of effect it will have on subsequent generations).
102. It is possible that most members of Congress simply did not understand the impending
demographic problems. See BROWN, supra note 7, at 97 ("The understanding of actuarial cost-
ing of future benefits was almost as rare in Congress as any understanding of foreign social
insurance experience.").
103. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of a pay-as-you-go
system.
104. National attention was first drawn to social security's long-term funding problems in
the 1970s. As a result of the perceived "crisis," Congress amended social security in 1977 and
again in 1983. Following those amendments, social security moved toward a system with tempo-
rary partial-reserve financing, but, as the Trustees' most recent report illustrates, the amend-
ments did not solve social security's long-term funding problems. For a detailed discussion of
the political maneuvering leading up to the 1983 amendments, see PAUL LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK:
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (1985) [hereinafter LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK]; and
PAUL LIGHT, STILL ARTFUL WORK: THE CONTINUING POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
(2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter LIGHT, STILL ARTFUL WORK].
105. There are three basic approaches to privatizing social security: (1) immediate, com-
plete privatization of the benefits of all participants; (2) immediate, complete privatization of the
benefits of some, but not all, workers; and (3) partial privatization. Robert J. Myers, Privatiza-
tion of Social Security: A Good Idea?, J. AM. Soc'Y C.L.U. & CHFC 42, 43 (July 1996). As
partial privatization proposals are by far the most common and are given the most serious con-
sideration, this article will address only partial privatization proposals.
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as a fairly radical recommendation, 10 6 proposals to privatize partially social
security have begun to receive increasing attention in the popular press.
10 7
In addition, policymakers have begun to give the proposals serious considera-
tion. Most recently, seven of the thirteen members of the 1994-1996 Social
Security Advisory Council advocated partial privatization of social security in
a report they issued in January 1997.108 Similarly, a number of members of
the President's Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform ad-
vocated partial privatization in the Commission's Final Report released in
December 1995.109 Moreover, in recent years, members of Congress have
106. See, e.g. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I , supra note 24, at 134 ("[T]here was a
time when discussing personal accounts as a component of Social Security was radical."); FER-
RARA, supra note 34, at 15 (describing as "radical" his proposal to split welfare and insurance
functions of social security into separate programs and sets of institutions and completely turn
over insurance portion of program to private sector); WEAVER, supra note 7, at 193 (describing
proposals to privatize social security as radical); Deborah H. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Pru-
dent Risks for Anxious Workers, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (noting that privatization was
once a notion that appealed to same constituency that planned to block fluoridation of water
supply). Of course, some opponents of privatization still describe such proposals as radical. See
e.g., Peter A. Diamond, The Future of Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR
THE FUTURE?, supra note 58, at 225, 231.
107. See, e.g, David Hage, Pro and Con, Privatizing Social Security, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 3, 1995, at 47; Bob Kerrey & Alan K. Simpson, How to Save Social Security, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1995, at A17; Peter G. Peterson, Will America Grow Up Before It Grows Old?,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1996, at 55; Privatize Social Security, Some Think Tanks Say, LEXING-
TON HERALD-LEADER, June 9, 1997, at A9; Paul Craig Roberts, It's Time to Privatize Social
Security, Bus. WKLY., Feb. 27, 1995, at 32; Face the Nation: Daschle Rejects Social Security Priva-
tization Idea (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 6, 1997, Associated Press), available in 1997 WL
2492395.
Some of the recent attention given to privatization may be attributable to the Cato Insti-
tute's interest in the issue. In 1995, the Cato Institute created the "Cato Project on Social Secur-
ity Privatization," made up of 22 economists, academics, investment advisers, insurance
executives, and former government officials, whose charge was to develop and promote a politi-
cally and economically workable plan to privatize social security. See Barry B. Burr, Think
Tank's Call to Reform Big Program, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 8, 1996, at 10; Robert
Dreyfuss, The Biggest Deal: Lobbying to Take Social Security Private, 26 AM. PROSPECT 72
(May-June 1996).
108. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24. The fact that members of the
Advisory Council proposed privatization of social security is of particular significance because
historically the Advisory Council has played a vital role in social security policymaking. BOOM,
supra note 7, at 29-30 (citing importance of Advisory Council's contribution); BROWN, supra
note 7, at 113 (stating Advisory Councils on Social Security have been valuable); DERTHICK,
supra note 21, at 89 (noting important role played by Advisory Council on Social Security). That
significance may, however, be somewhat diminished because historically the importance of the
Advisory Council was in large part due to its ability to reach consensus, and the 1994-1996 Advi-
sory Council could not reach consensus on the issue of privatization. Id. at 107-08.
109. BIPARTISAN COMM'N FINAL REP., supra note 24, at 26, 40.
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introduced bills to privatize partially social security,110 and congressional
subcommittees considered the issue at hearings.111
Although partial privatization proposals differ widely in their details,
most share the same basic elements. 11 2 Typically, they require113 all cur-
rently covered workers (or perhaps only those workers under a certain age)
and all future new workers to contribute some percentage of their social se-
curity contributions to an individual account and to invest the contributions
in one or more private funds. The proposals then provide two tiers of bene-
fits. The first tier may entitle all participants to a flat benefit regardless of
earnings. In the alternative, like benefits under the current system, the first
tier benefit may be based in part on earnings, but provide a greater return on
lower wages than on higher wages. First tier benefits typically are lower than
benefits under the current system to reflect the diversion of contributions to
the individual account. 114 The second tier benefit consists of the proceeds of
110. See, e.g., S. 321, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) ("providing personal investment plans
funded by employee social security payroll deductions to extend solvency of old-age, survivors,
and disability insurance program"); H.R. 3758, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) ("providing prospec-
tively for personal retirement savings accounts to allow for more control by individuals over
their social security retirement income"); S. 825, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) ("providing for
long range solvency of old-age survivors, and disability insurance program"); H.R. 3803, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) ("to reduce social security taxes and to provide for social security individ-
ual retirement accounts funded by social security payroll deductions"); H.R. 306, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) ("reducing social security taxes and to provide for establishment of individual social
security retirement accounts funded by payroll deductions and employer contributions equal to
amount of tax reduction"); H.R. 5159, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) ("reducing social security
taxes and to provide for social security individual retirement accounts funded by social security
payroll deductions"); H.R. 2178, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("reducing social security taxes and
to provide for social security individual retirement accounts funded by social security payroll
deductions"); H.R. 1647, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("reducing social security taxes and to
provide for social security individual retirement accounts funded by social security payroll de-
ductions"); S. 2026, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (allowing employees to elect to place percentage
of social security contributions in qualified pension plan).
111. See, e.g., Proposals, supra note 4; Retirement Income Security: Can the Baby Boomer
Generation Afford to Retire?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE TRUST FUND
RESERVES 6-8 (1990) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL].
112. Michael J. Boskin, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and John B. Shoven offered a decidedly
unique reform proposal. See Michael J. Boskin et al., Personal Security Accounts: A Proposal for
Fundamental Social Security Reform, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS, supra note
34, at 179-201. They call for the creation of personal security accounts from which individuals
could purchase insurance customized to suit their needs. Although five members of the Social
Security Advisory Council adopted the term "personal security account" to describe their propo-
sal, the proposal otherwise bears little resemblance to the Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Shoven propo-
sal. Id. at 181.
113. For a discussion of why the proposals are mandatory rather than optional, see supra
notes 30-34 and accompanying text and infra Part III.C.
114. Depending on the proposal, they may provide more, less, or the same redistribution
that is provided under the current system. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") devised a
method to adjust first tier benefits to recover fully the subsidy higher-income workers currently
provide lower-income workers under the current social security system. The GAO began by
1998] PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
the individual account and is entirely dependent on contributions to the indi-
vidual account and earnings on those contributions.
Privatization proposals vary a great deal in details such as: the percent-
age to be contributed to the individual account; the limitations, if any, im-
posed on the funds in which the worker may invest individual account
contributions; the manner in which the proceeds of the individual account
may be paid out upon retirement; and the amount and calculation of the first
tier benefit. 115 A comparison of the two privatization proposals advocated
by members of the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council illustrates the
range of these differences.
Unable to reach a consensus on how to reform social security, the Advi-
sory Council released a report in January 1997 setting forth three different
proposals for reform, 1 16 two of which include provisions for the partial priva-
tization of social security." 7 The first proposal" 8 recommends, among other
determining the average implicit rate of return each age group would receive from social secur-
ity. It then subtracted for each worker an amount equivalent to the annuity that the worker's
diverted taxes would have purchased if the worker had earned her age group rate of return. By
applying the same age group reduction to everyone, the adjustment would achieve the current
system's redistribution because individuals earn different rates of return under social security
depending on their level of income. See ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL, supra note 111, at 6-7.
115. Some also vary in the duration of privatization. For example, the Advisory Council
proposals contemplate permanent privatization while Representative Porter proposed that social
security be privatized on a temporary basis - for as long as social security collects contributions
that exceed benefit costs. For a detailed discussion of the Porter proposal, see id. at 6-7.
116. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24.
117. The third approach would make minor modifications, such as extending the benefit
computation period and covering newly hired state and local government employees, but other-
wise maintain the present social security structure essentially as it is. ADVISORY COUNCIL RE-
PORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 25-27. It does not include any provision for private investment
but does envision, "after a period of study and evaluation," the possibility of the government
investing the OASDI Trust Fund surplus in the equity market. Id. at 25. According to at least
one commentator, any investment of social security funds in the equity market constitutes
"privatization," even if the investment is done by and held by the government. See Davis, supra
note 4, at *1 ("All the members of the [Social Security Council] advocate investing some of the
$400 billion of Social Security taxes collected each year in the stock market - in effect, 'privatiz-
ing' a portion of the system."). Nevertheless, as explained supra note 4, for purposes of this
article, privatization will refer only to proposals that require individuals to direct their own ac-
counts and bear investment risks.
Five members of the Advisory Council, Robert M. Ball, Founding Chair, National Academy
of Social Insurance and former U.S. Commissioner on Social Security; Gloria T. Johnson, Direc-
tor of the Department of Social Action, International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried,
Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO; Thomas W. Jones, Vice Chairman, President and
Chief Operating Officer, TIAA-CREF; George Kourpias, President, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO; and Gerald M. Shea, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Government Affairs, fully endorse this proposal. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I,
supra note 24, at 25 n.12. One member of the Council, Edith U. Fierst, Attorney-at-Law, Fierst
& Moss, P.C., supports most, but not all, of the proposal. Id.
118. Two members of the Council, Edward M. Gramlich, Dean, School of Public Policy,
University of Michigan, and Marc M. Twinney, (Retired) Director of Pensions, Ford Motor
Company, endorse this proposal. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 28
n.14.
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things,1 1 9 (1) the establishment of individual accounts ("IAs") for partici-
pants; (2) a mandatory additional contribution of 1.6% of covered payroll to
fund the lAs;120 (3) individuals' investment choices be limited to govern-
ment-managed index funds;121 and (4) IA balances be converted to single or
joint minimum guarantee indexed annuities upon retirement. 22 The first tier
benefit, like the current social security benefit, is based in part on contribu-
tions. The proposal contemplates retaining the current 90% replacement
rate for low earnings. It then proposes to decrease the replacement rate for
middle earnings from 32% to 22.4% and decrease the replacement rate for
high earnings from 15% to 10.5%.123
The second Advisory Council proposal 24 recommends, among other
things, 125 (1) the creation of personal security accounts ("PSAs"), (2) that
the PSAs be funded by the reallocation of five percentage points of the em-
ployee's share of the current OASI tax, (3) that the PSAs be individually
owned, privately managed, and subject to limited regulatory constraints, (4)
that the funds be freely available for withdrawal at age sixty-two, and (5) that
any funds remaining in the individuals' PSAs at death be includible in the
119. Other recommendations include accelerating and extending the gradual increase in the
age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, slowing the growth of basic benefits, especially for
middle- and high-wage workers, increasing survivors' protection for two-earner couples, and
lowering dependent spouse benefits. Id. at 25-27.
120. That is, wages from covered employment and self-employment up to the maximum
taxable wage base. See supra notes 24 and 41 and accompanying text.
121. The proposal does not specify which index funds would be selected or how the selec-
tion would be made. For a general discussion of the advantages of investing in stock index funds,
see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET: INCLUDING A LIFE-CYcLE
GUIDE TO PERSONAL INVESTING 359-66 (5th ed. 1990).
122. The Advisory Council Report further elaborates:
The minimum guarantee provision would assure that some portion of the purchase
price of the annuity-say, an amount equal to 1 year's worth of the annuity-would be
payable in all cases. Thus, even if a worker who had elected a single annuity died after
receiving only one annuity payment, an additional sum would be paid to the survivors.
As is the case with other pension plans, a married worker would have a choice (with the
consent of the spouse) on whether a single or 'joint and survivor' annuity was chosen.
(The 'joint and survivor' option would provide a lower basic annuity while the worker
was alive, but would continue to pay a portion of the annuity to the survivor after the
worker's death.)
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 28.
123. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of current replacement
rates and how social security benefits are calculated.
124. Five members of the Council, Joan T. Bok, Chairman, New England Electric System;
Ann L. Combs, Principal, William M. Mercer, Inc.; Sylvester J. Schieber, Vice President, Watson
Wyatt Worldwide Co.; Fidel A. Vargas, Mayor, City of Baldwin Park, California; and Carolyn L.
Weaver, Director, Social Security and Pension Studies, The American Enterprise Institute, en-
dorse this proposal. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 30 n.20.
125. Other recommendations include accelerating and extending the gradual increase in the
age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, eliminating the retirement earning test, extending
social security coverage to all state and local government employees hired after 1997, and
amending the spouse, survivor, and disabled worker OASDI benefits. ADVISORY COUNCIL RE-
PORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 30-33.
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individual's estate. 126 The PSA proposal provides a flat first tier benefit for
all workers under age twenty-five in 1988 equal to $410 per month in 1996
dollars, or the equivalent of 65% of the current poverty level for an elderly
person living alone or 76% of the benefit payable to a low wage worker retir-
ing in 1996.127
The privatization proposals differ fundamentally from our current sys-
tem in two ways. First, they move away from our current pay-as-you-go sys-
tem toward a funded system because benefits from the privatized portion of
the system, the individual accounts, are fully funded. Second, the proposals
subject workers to investment risk. Returns from the second tier, the individ-
ual accounts, are dependent entirely on contributions and earnings on those
contributions.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE SOLUTION
In today's seemingly endless bull market, the privatization proposals
may appear quite appealing. They offer social security participants the op-
portunity to earn market rates of return on contributions to social security.
The proposals, however, may not be quite as appealing as they appear at first
blush. First, they do not guarantee workers that they will do better than
under the current system. Rather, they subject participants to investment
risk. Second, they may impose significant transition costs. In addition, by
requiring workers to save for retirement while subjecting them to investment
risk, the proposals promote irrational paternalism. Finally, the proposals
misconceive the role social security should play in our national retirement
system.
A. Investment Risk
Proponents of privatization typically emphasize the potential return to
participants under a privatized social security system. They contend that
privatization is an improvement over the current system because it offers the
potential of a better return than the current system. 128 For example, propo-
nents of the Advisory Council's PSA proposal devote considerable attention
126. Id.
127. Id. at 31.
128. Proponents offer additional justifications for privatization. For example, Representa-
tive John Porter claimed that his proposal to privatize social security on a temporary basis would
(1) unmask the federal government's general budget deficit; (2) increase the national savings
rate and American competitiveness; and (3) provide "individuals an opportunity to improve
their overall retirement income by earning a higher return on their contributions in the private
sector than under Social Security." ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL, supra note 111, at 1. For a dis-
cussion of the effect of a funded system on national savings and the unmasking of the federal
deficit, see generally Bosworth, supra note 58, at 102-08; Promoting National Saving Through
Social Security Trust Funds, in LOOMING SURPLUSES, supra note 22, at 17-38.
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to comparing the internal rates of return 129 offered by the three Advisory
Council proposals. 130 The proponents contend that the PSA plan offers the
best internal rate of return in most cases13 1 and thus suggest that the plan is
superior for that reason. 132 Similarly, the PSA advocates compare the
,'money's worth" ratios1 33 offered by the three proposals and contend that
the PSA plan offers the highest ratios for workers born after the early
1960s.134 They suggest that the PSA plan is superior for that reason.
1 35
Like most proponents of privatization, the advocates of the PSA plan
base their projections on the assumption that "workers will receive a rate of
return consistent with the average historical long-term rates of return on eq-
uities."' 136 They concede, however, that there is no guarantee that future re-
turns will reflect past returns. 137 Indeed, it is a well-known caveat of
financial planning that past returns are no guarantee of future returns.
Over the last 100 years, the average real return on stocks in the United
States was about 7%.138 Over shorter periods of time, however, the returns
have fluctuated enormously. 139 For example, in the 1970s, stocks averaged
returns of -1.4% while they averaged returns of 11.8% in the 1980s. 140 Infla-
129. The internal rate of return is the "rate of return at which the present discounted value
of future benefits is equal to the present discounted value of taxes paid." ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 38.
130. See id. at 38-46.
131. The proponents concede that the MB plan offers greater or equal internal rates of
return for one-earner couples but discount the importance of that differential because one-
earner couples are now much less common than they were when social security was enacted in
1935. Id. at 43.
132. The proponents of the plan concede that how well each plan does depends on the
criteria used. None of the plans surpasses the others in all dimensions. Id. at 58.
133. Money's worth ratio is the "present value of the benefits a typical individual has re-
ceived or is expected to receive compared to the present value of the payroll taxes, discounted at
the actual past and projected future rates of return on government bonds held by the Social
Security trust funds." Id. at 46.
134. Id. at 46-49.
135. For other examples of advocates of privatization focusing on the potential superior
rates of return, see Proposals, supra note 4, at 74 (testimony by Peter J. Ferrara, Senior Fellow,
National Center for Policy Analysis); SAM BEARD, RESTORING HOPE IN AMERICA: THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SOLUTION (1996); Advisory Council Member Calls on Administration to Act, 24 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 110, 111 (1997); News Briefs, Low Return on Social Security, 24 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) 253 (1997); William G. Shipman, The Cato Project on Social Security Priva-
tization, Retiring with Dignity: Social Security vs. Private Markets, SSP No. 2 (Aug. 14, 1995)
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/ssp2.html>.
136. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 46.
137. Id.
138. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle, 34 J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE 42, 42 (1996).
139. See generally STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND INFLATION 1995 YEARBOOK (Ibboston As-
soc. (1995). The standard deviation on large company stock returns has been over twenty per-
cent. Id. at 33. Thus, in any given year, a one-third chance exists that returns could be as high as
27% or as low as -15%. Alicia H. Munnell, Book Review: Prospects for Real Reform, 6 J. POL'Y
ANAL. & MGMT. 456, 458 (1987).
140. ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL, supra note 111, at 8.
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tion-adjusted annual returns for Standard and Poor 500 stocks for rolling
twenty-year periods between 1957 and 1990, ranged from approximately 1%
to more than 5%.141 If workers are required to annuitize their individual
account benefit upon retirement, as the IA proposal requires, market fluctua-
tions could have a dramatic impact on returns particular workers earn, de-
pending on the year they retire. 142
Even if workers are not required to annuitize their individual account
benefit, as the PSA plan proposes, and can ride out market fluctuations,
there is no guarantee that all "workers will receive a rate of return consistent
with the average historical long-term rates of return on equities. ' 143 First, to
the extent that workers are free to invest in assets other than equity in-
dexes, 144 there is no guarantee that they will earn the average real return on
stocks, whatever that may be. For example, to the extent that individuals
invest in corporate bond indexes, as the IA proposal would allow, their re-
turns are likely to be lower than the average stock returns because corporate
bond returns typically are lower than stock returns. 145 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that workers are entitled to invest in particular stocks, as the PSA propo-
sal would permit, workers may earn substantially different rates of return
than the average equity return. Although the average real return on stocks
was about seven percent over the last century, returns on individual stocks
have varied enormously. For example, although the nominal annual return
on the Standard and Poor 500 Index was 23% in 1996,146 returns on individ-
ual stocks varied from as much as 207% to -43.5% that year.' 47 Finally, by
substantially increasing the demand for equities, privatization could cause the
long-term rates of return on equities to decrease. 148
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining if an individual account earned interest at the inflation
adjusted-adjusted rate that the S&P earned from 1967 to 1986, it would earn 3.7% while another
individual account would earn 1.4% if it earned the rate from 1965 to 1984).
143. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 46.
144. The PSA proposal would limit investments to financial instruments that are widely
available in financial markets but would otherwise impose few restrictions on investments. Id. at
30. The IA proposal, in contrast, would impose far greater limits on investment choice. Individ-
uals would only be permitted to invest in portfolios ranging from those consisting entirely of
bond index funds to those consisting entirely of equity index funds. Id. at 28.
145. For example, over the 1980s, stocks earned returns averaging 11.8% while bonds
earned an average return of 7.5%. For rolling 20-year periods between 1957 and 1990, inflation-
adjusted average returns for stocks ranged from about 1% to over 5% while bond return aver-
ages ranged from about -2.7% to roughly 3.2%. ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL, supra note 111, at 8.
146. Duff J. McDonald, Beat the U.S. Market Without Leaving the U.S., MONEY, Feb. 1997,
at 42.
147. Erin Davies, The Ins and Outs of This Year's 5 Hundred, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, at
Fl.
148. See generally Myers, supra note 105, at 45 ("If such huge amounts of money were
available for investment in common stocks, then it is likely that rates of return will be lower than
historical ones. Such massive new investment would probably produce some desirable economic
growth, but there are limits to this effect. Moreover, the vast majority of the private contribu-
tions would go into the secondary capital markets, rather than into issues which would generate
new capital.").
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Although privatization offers workers the potential to earn better rates
of return than may be possible under the current system, it does not guaran-
tee them better rates of return. Rather, it subjects them to investment risk.
Individuals might do very well; on the other hand, they might do very poorly.
The privatization proposals simply do not guarantee workers that they will
do better than under the current system. Indeed, individual investment expe-
rience in the 401(k) area indicates that most individuals are ill-equipped to
make investment decisions 149 and thus suggests that they may in fact not do
well under a privatized system.150
B. Transition Costs
Not only do the privatization proposals subject workers to investment
risk, but they may also impose significant transition costs. Privatizing social
security inevitably involves transition costs. As discussed above, 15 1 the social
security system has been funded predominantly on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Thus, contributions from current workers have funded current retirees' bene-
fits. Transferring from the current system to a privatized system requires not
only that money be set aside in individual accounts to fund current workers'
future benefits, but that current retirees continue to be paid benefits. Thus,
privatizing social security - or switching to any other type of funded system
- requires the funding of two sets of benefits at the same time.' 52
149. See Survey Finds Employees Lack Understanding in Retirement Preparation, 24 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1679, 1689 (July 21, 1997) (according to survey of benefits managers by
Merrill Lynch & Co., less than 40% of employees have a good understanding of the factors that
affect savings and retirement plans); Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 106, at 1177 (proposing
reform of current pension fiduciary rules to protect financially unsophisticated workers); see,
e.g., Nancy Van Gelder, Defined Contribution Upsurge Shifts Sponsor Obligation, PENSION
WORLD, July 1993, at 23, 25 ("Survey data indicates that most employees in defined contribution
plans: vastly underestimate the impact of inflation; tend to put too much of their money in low-
yield, short-term issues, even when they have 20 or more years until retirement; hold more GICs
and employer stock than defined benefit plans, creating poor diversification and unintended
credit risk; tend to avoid equities, thereby failing to take enough acceptable risk; and, pay higher
per capita costs-100% more than defined benefit plans in some cases."); Archie B. Spangler, A
Disciplined Approach to 401(k)/404(c) Retirement Plan Administration, PENSION WORLD, May
1993, at 18, 19 ("somewhere between 60% and 80% of 401(k) plan assets are invested in sone
form of guaranteed investment vehicle, bonds or cash equivalents . . . [which] are among the
worst performing asset classes over time. We also know that the typical investor exhibits undis-
ciplined use of equities, the highest performing asset class, by focusing on the short run.").
150. See generally Part III.C.
151. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
152. For discussions of the transition costs of converting from a pay-as-you-go system to a
funded system, see, for example, BOSKIN, supra note 61, at 100-01; FERRARA, supra note 34, at
337; MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 130; Blinder, supra note 33, at 25; Bosworth, supra note 58, at
89, 100; Munnell, supra note 72, at 197; Lawrence H. Thompson, The Social Security Reform
Debate, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1425, 1443 (1983); Carolyn L. Weaver, Comment, in SOCIAL
SECURITY: WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE?, supra note 58, at 118; Peter M. Wheeler & John R.
Kearney, Income Protection for the Aged in the 21st Century: A Framework to Help Inform the
Debate, 59 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 15 (Summer 1996).
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The transition costs need not be financed by a payroll tax. They may be
financed, for example, by general revenues or a broad-based consumption
tax.153 Thus, current workers need not necessarily directly bear the burden
of paying for benefits twice. The transition costs, however, must be financed
from some source.
The proponents of the Advisory Council's PSA plan concede that their
plan imposes transition costs. 154 They propose to finance those costs by in-
creasing the payroll tax by 1.52% for seventy-two years and borrowing an
estimated $1.9 trillion (in 1995 dollars) over the next forty years.' 55
The proponents of the Advisory Council's IA plan, in contrast, assert
that their plan involves no transition costs. 156 They claim that "[t]he IA plan
is designed to phase in naturally. The proceeds from the individual accounts
gradually build up as the central OASDI benefits phase down, so that all
classes of workers receive about the same benefits and the system changes
naturally from the present system to the new system. 157
Contrary to the IA plan's proponents' claims, it is not possible to convert
from a pay-as-you-go system to a partially funded system without imposing
transition costs.158 The IA plan requires that workers (and their employers)
continue to pay the 12.4% payroll tax to fund current benefits,' 59 and it im-
poses an additional 1.6% payroll tax to fund individual accounts to provide
for current workers' future benefits. By requiring that current workers fund
both current retirees' benefits and partially fund their own future benefits,
the IA plan necessarily imposes transition costs.
While the transition costs in the two plans might, at first blush, appear
similar, the transition costs of the PSA plan are actually much more substan-
tial. The PSA plan requires not only a seventy-two year 1.52% tax hike but
also requires repayment on an estimated $1.9 trillion loan over the next forty
153. The advocates of the PSA plan would prefer to finance the transition costs through a
consumption-based tax. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 109. Chile
planned for its transition costs by running a budget surplus for several years. Wheeler & Kear-
ney, supra note 152, at 15; see also Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social
Security: Eight Myths, 74 TAX NOTES 1167, 1171-72 (1997) (describing proposed methods of
financing transition costs of privatization).
154. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 30, 32.
155. Id. at 32.
156. Id. at 156.
157. Id.
158. See Weaver, supra note 152, at 118 ("As an aside, Bosworth suggests that the double
tax problem can somehow be avoided by partial advance funding. This is not convincing. Any
plan to convert from a system of unfunded debt to a system involving some real saving will
involve added costs.").
159. Currently, a percentage of the 12.4% payroll tax is being set aside to fund a temporary
partial-reserve. See supra note 59. To the extent that current workers' contributions go toward
the partial-reserve, workers are already paying some transition costs under the current system.
See Weaver, supra note 152, at 118.
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years. 160 The actual cost of the PSA plan is estimated to be over 4% of
payroll in the early years of the plan.161 The PSA plan imposes higher transi-
tion costs because it involves greater advance funding - 5% of payroll
rather than the 1.6% of payroll under the IA plan.' 62
The transition costs imposed by a particular privatization proposal de-
pend upon the amount of advance funding the proposal contemplates: the
greater the advance funding, the greater the transition costs. Nevertheless, to
the extent that any privatization proposal contemplates converting any por-
tion of the current system to a privatized system while retaining the old sys-
tem, it must necessarily impose transition costs. The burden of the transition
cost varies with the degree of advance funding.
C. Misguided Paternalism
Not only do the privatization proposals impose transition costs, but they
also promote misguided paternalism. Social security is a paternalistic pol-
icy. 16 3 It forces individuals to save for retirement' 64 for their own good. 165
160. Specifically, the plan contemplates total direct borrowing to reach $1.9 trillion in 2034,
and, with interest continuing to accumulate, to peak at $2.1 trillion in 2039. ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 112.
161. Id. at 34.
162. The difference in the level of pre-funding also explains why the transition costs under
the PSA plan are much higher than the transition costs would have been under the Kerrey-
Simpson Bill, S. 825, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would have diverted two percent of the
current payroll tax to individual accounts. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. 1, supra note
24, at 109.
163. Gerald Dworkin defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of
action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests,
or values of the persons being coerced." Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 20
(1983). On paternalism generally, see, for example, PATERNALISM (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983),
and JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1983).
164. Some economists view social security as an annual tax transfer program redistributing
income from the relatively affluent working population to the relatively poor retired. More
commonly, however, economists apply a lifetime framework to social security and view payroll
taxes as mandatory saving for retirement. MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 7-8, 90; see also Thomp-
son, supra note 152, 1436-38 (describing three competing conceptual models of social security:
tax-transfer model, insurance model, and annuity welfare model); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalis-
tic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 1275, 1279
& n. 11 (1991); Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 106, at 1179 n.3.
While there may be some question as to whether the current system, predominantly funded
on a pay-as-you-go basis, constitutes an annual tax transfer program or a mandatory saving pro-
gram, it seems clear that privatization proposals that require individuals to set aside a certain
percentage of their income in an individual account for retirement and do not redistribute any
portion of the amount set aside constitute mandatory savings programs.
165. One may argue that social security is for the government's good rather than for the
individual's good because it reduces the government's welfare costs. See, e.g., KLEINIO, supra
note 163, at 165-66; Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 790, 820-21 (1988); Thompson, supra
note 152, at 1441. See also supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text for one justification for the
compulsory nature of social security. Typically, however, forced savings is viewed as promoting
the good of the individual rather than that of the government. Bankman, supra, at 820.
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At its most basic level, the paternalistic argument provides that without so-
cial security people will not provide adequately for their old age. Thus, we
must force them to participate in social security to protect themselves from
starvation, misery, poverty, and regret.
166
Although not entirely free from criticism, 167 paternalism may justify the
current social security system.168 Specifically, the current system may pro-
tect individuals from mistakes or irrational behavior. Paternalism, however,
does not justify privatization of the system.
The principle criticism of paternalism in general, and social security's
paternalistic policy in particular, is that it deprives individuals of their lib-
erty;169 that is, social security forces individuals to purchase retirement annu-
ities from the government, whether they want to or not. The current social
security system may be justified in overriding individual liberty because it
helps prevent mistakes and protects individuals from irrational behavior.
Prevention of mistakes and protection against irrational behavior, however,
do not justify privatization of the system.
Professor Joseph Bankman notes two different types of mistakes that
may justify the forced purchase of retirement annuities.1 70 The first type of
Of course, other rationales also may be given for social security. See, e.g., Peter A. Dia-
mond, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 J. PUBLIC ECON. 275 (1977) (offering income
redistribution, market failure, paternalism, and efficiency as reasons for social security); James
Tobin, The Future of Social Security: One Economist's Assessment, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BE-
YOND THE RHETORIC OF CRIsIs 41, 59 (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988)
(offering paternalism, externalities in universal participation, advantages of universal system,
and income redistribution as rationales for mandatory social security system); William H. Simon,
Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1446-48 (1986) (noting in
addition to paternalism, market failure and redistribution are rationales for social security).
166. See FERRARA, supra note 34, at 279-80; Tobin, supra note 165, 58; Weiss, supra note
164, at 1279.
167. Indeed, according to one scholar, "[p]aternalism has long been held in disrepute."
Weiss, supra note 164, at 1279. For a libertarian critique of social security's paternalistic policy,
see FERRARA, supra note 34, at 279-81.
168. As Professor Bankman has noted, "proposals for or against forced retirement saving
raise nearly unresolvable issues. Although there are many good arguments in favor of forced
saving, none of those arguments is without difficulty. Perhaps the most that can be said is that
the cumulative weight of the arguments, considered in light of the misery faced by the elderly
poor, might plausibly support a regimen of forced saving." Bankman, supra note 165, at 821; see
also Diamond, supra note 165, at 275 (presenting evidence suggesting that in absence of social
security, sizable fraction of American workers would not save enough for retirement); Thomp-
son, supra note 152, at 1442 ("It appears by a simple count of those who have addressed this
issue in the Social Security literature, the vast majority believe that the gains from mandating
some form of provision for retirement justify the concomitant sacrifice of free choice. In the
end, the relative importance of free choice is a value judgment.").
169. See, e.g., FERRARA, supra note 34, at 279-81 (discussing tendencies of paternalism to
deny citizens choice and liberty); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 187-89 (1962)
(same).
170. Bankman, supra note 165, at 817. Professor Bankman discusses the justifications for
the forced purchase of retirement annuities in the context of the private retirement system, but
the justifications are equally applicable to social security. Id.
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mistake, factual mistake, is inherent in the complexity of investment deci-
sions. Professor Bankman notes that:
[Tihe amount of current saving required to support a desired life
style upon retirement is dependent upon future income, health and
life expectancy, short-term and long-term inflation, and the risk-ad-
justed rate of return on alternative investments. Relatively minor
errors [in the factual assumptions regarding any of these factors]
can significantly affect the financial resources available upon
retirement.171
The current social security system protects workers from such mistakes by
providing workers with a defined benefit upon retirement. Prevention of
such mistakes, however, does not justify privatization of the system.17 2 Priva-
tization subjects participants to investment risk and does not guarantee par-
ticipants any particular return on their contributions to their individual
accounts. Thus, prevention of such mistakes counsels against privatization of
the system.
The second type of mistake focuses on the financial knowledge and eco-
nomic sophistication of individual employees. Professor Bankman notes,
"[R]etirement planning requires a facility with numbers, and the ability to
understand, if not calculate, compound rates of return, amortization sched-
ules, and the present value of a future sum.' 73 "[T]he inability of employees
effectively to make use of [such] factual information may justify forced
purchase of retirement annuities."'1 74 Protecting against such inabilities may
justify the current social security system because it guarantees workers a spe-
cific benefit in return for the money it forces them to set aside. These inabili-
ties, however, counsel against privatization because privatization forces
individuals to make investment decisions and thus requires them to under-
stand, if not calculate, compound rates of return in making those decisions.175
Professor Deborah Weiss describes three different types of irrational be-
havior protection against which may justify social security's paternalistic pol-
icy. 176 Professor Weiss describes the first type of irrational behavior as
171. Id. at 816 (footnote omitted); see also PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 22, at 61 (discuss-
ing uncertainties that make individual retirement planning difficult); Thompson, supra note 152,
at 1440 (same).
172. As Professor Bankman notes, there may be ways to prevent mistakes without subject-
ing workers to forced savings. For example, individuals may hire professional advisors, make
voluntary contributions to employer-managed pension plans, or purchase annuities from regu-
lated financial institutions. Moreover, it may be possible to avoid mistakes by providing govern-
ment-supplied information rather than forced purchase of annuities. Bankman, supra note 165,
at 816-17. Although these arguments may cast doubt on social security's policy of forcing indi-
viduals to save for retirement in the first place, they in no way support the privatization propos-
als. The privatization proposals, like the current system, force individuals to save for retirement.
173. Id. at 817.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of investment risk.
176. Weiss, supra note 164, at 1275. Like Professor Bankman, Professor Weiss discusses
this behavior principally in connection with our private pension system. Nevertheless, the dis-
cussion is equally relevant to our social security system.
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myopic. "Myopes" simply do not think much about the future. They spend
money as they receive it and regret not having saved more when they retire
and are forced to lower their standard of living. 177 Arguably, protection
against myopia may justify both the current social security system and a par-
tially privatized system because both force individuals to save for retirement.
Nevertheless, the current system is likely to do a better job of protecting
against myopia because it provides workers with a defined benefit and does
not tie the benefit to individual investment experience. If a myope simply
does not think much about the future, she is likely to underestimate the
amount of time she should devote to investment decisions and thus make
unwise investment choices because she does not appreciate the importance of
such decisions.
Professor Weiss describes individuals who engage in the second type of
irrational behavior as "impulsives."'1 7 8 Impulsives worry about their future
and plan to save more, but find that they cannot. They spend their paycheck
the minute they receive it and quickly regret their impetuousness. 179 Impul-
sives may rely on "precommitment devices" to protect themselves from their
impulsive behavior. For example, they may forego higher interest rates and
put money in a Christmas club account to ensure they have money set aside
when Christmas arrives, or they may knowingly and willingly permit the IRS
to overwithhold taxes to ensure that they receive a refund. 180 Arguably, both
the current social security system and a partially privatized system may be
justified as precommitment devices that force individuals to save for retire-
ment and protect them from impulsive behavior. 181 The current system,
however, is likely to provide better protection against impulsive behavior
than a partially privatized system because impulsives are unlikely to be good
long-term investors. As discussed above, stock returns may fluctuate enor-
mously over short periods of time. Thus, at times, long-term investing may
require investors to be patient and ride out slumps in the market. Impulsives,
177. Id. at 1285. Professor Weiss explains why such behavior is irrational: "In common
sense terms, myopia is an irrational preference for present consumption over future consump-
tion. In economic terms, myopia is a discount rate that is irrationally larger than zero, or irra-
tionally higher than the interest rate." Id. at 1298.
For additional discussions of myopic behavior, see, for example, Bankman, supra note 165,
at 817 (presumably Professor Bankman was referring to myopic behavior when he asserted "[an
employee in her early working years may believe that a high retirement standard of living will
bring her little enjoyment. Upon retirement, that same employee may find additional income
for consumption and bequests extremely desirable."); and Thompson, supra note 152, at 1441.
178. Weiss, supra note 164, at 1285.
179. Id. at 1285. Such behavior may be viewed as "irrational" because it is inconsistent. Id.
at 1306-11.
180. Id. at 1307-08; Blinder, supra note 33, at 29.
181. Alan Blinder describes such paternalism as "Ulysses paternalism," named after
Ulysses who had himself tied to the mast to protect himself form the song of the Sirens. Dr.
Blinder asserts that Ulysess paternalism would only seem to support a voluntary pension system,
not a mandatory program. After all, Ulysess had himself tied to the mast; the government did
not require it. Nevertheless, Dr. Blinder contends that "Ulysses paternalism" helps to explain
social security's broad public support. Blinder, supra note 33, at 29-30.
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however, are unlikely to have the self-control necessary to do so. They are
likely to "buy high" and "sell low" and find little in their individual accounts
at retirement.
Professor Weiss describes individuals who engage in the third type of
irrational behavior as "impatients."'1 82 Impatients always believe that their
current consumption needs are particularly important. Although they are
cognizant of the need to save for the future, they believe that it will be easier
to save next year than it is this year. Each year they find that their current
needs are more important than they anticipated, and ultimately they find that
they have saved less for retirement than they originally contemplated. 183
Like impulsives, impatients also may rely on pre-commitment devices to pro-
tect themselves from their irrational behavior, 184 and both the current social
security system and a partially privatized system may be justified as precom-
mitment devices that force impatients to save for retirement and thus protect
them from their impatient behavior.185 Again, however, the current system
is likely to provide better protection against impatient behavior than does a
partially privatized system. Like impulsives, impatients are unlikely to be
good long-term investors. As impatients always believe that their current
consumption needs are particularly pressing, they are likely to believe that
their time can be more productively spent on current consumption needs and
desires than on long-term investing. They always believe that it will be easier
to devote the time necessary to make good investment decisions next week
or next year. Thus, they are unlikely ever to find the time necessary to make
such decisions.
Although not all commentators warmly embrace paternalism, it may jus-
tify our current social security system. Specifically, our current system may
protect against individual mistakes and irrational behavior in retirement
planning. A partially privatized social security system would continue to de-
prive individuals of their liberty by forcing them to save for retirement.
Privatization, however, is unlikely to do as good a job of protecting against
individual mistakes and irrational behavior. Accordingly, the privatization
proposals promote misguided paternalism.
D. National Retirement Income Security System
Not only do the privatization proposals promote misguided paternalism,
but they also misconceive the role social security should play in our national
retirement income security system. Since its inception, social security bal-
anced two competing policy objectives: equity and social adequacy. Equity
means that each worker should receive a benefit that is directly related, or
182. Weiss, supra note 164, at 1286-87.
183. Id. Like impulsive behavior, impatient behavior may be viewed as irrational because it
is inconsistent. Id. at 1300-06.
184. Id. at 1303.
185. Again, however, this reasoning may support only a voluntary savings program. See
supra note 181.
[Vol. 71
PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
actuarially equivalent, to the amount of her contributions. 186 Social ade-
quacy means that a certain standard of living should be provided for all con-
tributors, regardless of the level of their contributions,187 and implies some
degree of income redistribution.1 88 When originally enacted, social security
emphasized equity.189 The founders expected trust funds to accumulate and
stressed the principle of a fair rate of return to each worker.1 90 Even at the
outset, however, social security assured some degree of adequacy by provid-
ing a benefit formula that weighted benefits in favor of low earners. 19 1 In
any event, social security did not long emphasize equity. Within four years of
enacting the system, Congress amended the program to promote a greater
degree of social adequacy. Following the 1939 Amendments, social security
benefits were based on average earnings over a shorter period of time and
were extended to wives, widows, and orphaned children. 192 Since 1939, "the
primary emphasis in the evolution of [social security] has been on the con-
cept of adequacy in the prevention of hardship."'1
93
Wilbur J. Cohen once declared that the balancing of equity and ade-
quacy is "the art that has made social security an acceptable system." 194 In
fact, because of demographics and the way social security has been financed,
it has been able to ensure both adequacy and equity until now. Social secur-
ity has afforded adequacy by generally giving lower-income retirees greater
rates of return than higher-income retirees. 195 In addition, it has provided
equity by paying almost all retirees far more in benefits than they have paid
in taxes.196 The days of ensuring all participants both adequacy and com-
plete equity, however, have come to an end. Because of demographics and
186. MYERS, supra note 2, at 10.
187. Id.
188. Indeed, some commentators refer to the adequacy component as a welfare component.
See, e.g., FERRARA, supra note 34, at 6.
189. BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 29, 213-14.
190. MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 6.
191. Id. at 6 & n.2.
192. Id. at 6-7.
193. BROWN, supra note 7, at 25; see also DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 215 (explaining that
welfare objectives served as one of driving forces behind changes).
194. COHEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 68. But see FERRARA, supra note 34, at 3-4
(arguing that the inherent conflict in adequacy and equity is the source of all of the program's
major defects).
195. Whether social security has, in fact, redistributed income from the higher-paid to the
lower-paid is subject to dispute. Compare FERRARA, supra note 34, at 54-57, 292 (contending
that social security does not do a good job of redistributing income from the higher-paid to the
lower-paid); STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 44, at 1773-74 (contending that some of the high-
est paid have been subsidized by social security), with AARON, supra note 56, at 80 (arguing that
social security operates on progressive formula, providing larger lifetime wealth increments to
those workers with lower earnings); LIGHT, STILL ARTFUL WORK, supra note 104, at 37 (con-
tending that lower-income workers have received proportionally better benefits than higher in-
come workers).
196. As discussed in Part I.B.2, social security has been able to provide almost all retirees
with far greater benefits than they paid in contributions by redistributing income from the work-
ing generations to the retired generations.
1998]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
the way social security has been financed, social security will no longer be
able to ensure both adequacy and complete equity. A choice between ade-
quacy and equity must be made.
By promoting the potential return to workers under a privatized system,
the privatization proposals tend to mask the need to choose between equity
and adequacy. The proposals, however, do not eliminate the need to make
that choice. Rather, the privatization proposals choose equity over ade-
quacy. Their promotion of equity over adequacy can be seen in their design.
First, contributions are almost invariably based solely on earnings: contribu-
tions are a percentage of social security taxes and social security taxes are a
function of earnings. 197 In addition, individual account balances are based
entirely on contributions and earnings on those contributions. The privatiza-
tion proposals do not guarantee any level of benefits, let alone adequate ben-
efits, through the second tier individual accounts.
The privatization proposals may provide for some degree of adequacy
through the first tier of benefit they provide. Typically, however, the first tier
of benefit is lower than the benefits provided under the current system.
Moreover, the first tier benefit is not what makes the privatization proposals
unique. The proposals are unique precisely because they offer a second tier
of benefit, the individual account, 198 and the individual account benefit is
designed to promote equity over adequacy.
The privatization proposals err in choosing equity over adequacy for a
couple of reasons. First, social security is a mandatory program. To the ex-
tent that it requires all individuals to save for retirement, it should guarantee
them a particular return on their savings; it should not subject them to invest-
ment risk.199 As discussed above, forcing individuals to save for retirement
without guaranteeing them any return constitutes misguided paternalism.
Moreover, choosing equity over adequacy misconceives the role social secur-
ity should play in our national retirement income security system.
By creating individual accounts and basing benefits solely on workers'
earnings and returns on those earnings, the privatization proposals are clearly
197. In theory, contributions need not be based solely on earnings. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed in supra notes 112-15, the proposals almost invariably base contributions solely on
earnings.
198. As noted above, the privatization proposals also differ fundamentally from the current
system because the individual account benefits are funded rather than financed on a pay-as-you-
go basis. Individual accounts, however, need not be created for the system to be funded. In-
deed, the Economic Security Council originally contemplated a funded system to be managed by
the Social Security Board. In fact, benefits are currently partially funded through the temporary
surplus managed by the Social Security Administration.
199. Admittedly, under the current system participants are always subject to the political
risk that Congress may decrease benefits-or even eliminate the program altogether. In my
view, however, such risks are entirely different. First, they are inevitable. Current Congresses
cannot absolutely bind future Congresses. Moreover, the risks are of an entirely different na-
ture. Under the current system, Congress is taking an individual's freedom away and promising
a future benefit in return. Under a privatized system, Congress is taking an individual's freedom
away and making no promises in return.
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designed to promote the replacement of pre-retirement income rather than
the provision of socially adequate benefits. Arguably, the replacement of a
significant portion of an individual's pre-retirement income should be the ul-
timate goal of our national retirement income system.200 Replacement of a
significant portion of an individual's pre-retirement income protects against
the disruption of pre-retirement lifestyle after retirement. Protection against
such disruption, however, should not be the goal of a mandatory retirement
system like social security.20 1 Instead, such protection should be the goal of a
voluntary retirement system. To the extent that workers are required to save
for retirement, they should be so required to ensure that all workers have
socially adequate retirement incomes upon retirement. All workers, particu-
larly lower-income workers, should not be forced to save simply to ensure
that no retirees' lifestyle is disrupted after retirement.
In our country, economic security for the aged is provided through a
three-tiered system consisting of (1) a federal safety-net program called Sup-
plemental Security Income ("SSI"), (2) social security, and (3) private initia-
tives. 202 Although the three tiers of our retirement income security system
200. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NA-
TIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 1 (1981) [hereinafter COMING OF AGE] ("The Commission
believes that the replacement of pre[-] retirement disposable income from all sources is a desira-
ble retirement income goal."); Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security
and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 855 (1987) ("[R]eplacement of some significant portion
of pre[-]retirement wages must be the fundamental goal of retirement security policy."); cf. Bar-
bara Austin, Policies, Preferences and Perversions in the Tax-Assisted Retirement Savings System,
41 McGILL L.J. 571, 577 (1996) ("The government has established two basic policy objectives
behind providing tax assistance to retirement saving: (1) ensuring that all Canadians have ade-
quate retirement income, and (2) encouraging increased private saving now to meet pension
needs in the future. Ensuring adequate retirement income has generally meant both guarantee-
ing a basic level of retirement income for all Canadians and assisting them in avoiding serious
disruption of their pre-retirement living standards.").
201. But see generally COMING OF AGE, supra note 200, at 5 (stating that replacement of
pre-retirement income is desirable goal); Graetz, supra note 200 (arguing for mandatory retire-
ment system to ensure replacement of pre-retirement income).
202. BROWN, supra note 27, at 55 (discussing high level objectives of each of three retire-
ment system tiers); MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 5 (outlining three-tier structure).
Not all commentators describe our national retirement system in the same manner. Some
separate the private sector into two separate components, employer-sponsored pension pro-
grams and private, individual savings, and contend that our national retirement system consists
of four tiers. See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15 (stating that
retirement security system is four-tier system); MYERS, supra note 2, at 5 (describing four-legged
stool for providing economic security); Ball, supra note 18, at 171 (identifying four elements
comprising our approach to retirement income). Others separate the private sector into the
same two components but omit SSI. See BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 93 ("Con-
ventional wisdom holds that retirement income depends on a three-legged stool composed of
Social Security, private employment-based group plans, and individual savings. Some add a
fourth leg to provide for those without sufficient income from the other three, needs-tested pro-
grams, such as SSI .. "). See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 200, at 852-53 (identifying three tier
structure for retirement income including social security, employer-provided pensions, and indi-
vidual savings).
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may overlap and work at cross purposes at times,20 3 they can and should
perform distinct but rationally integrated roles in providing national retire-
ment income security.20 4
Social security should "serve[ ] as a floor of protection on which private-
sector economic-security measures can be built."'20 5 As such, social security
should focus on the provision of socially adequate benefits rather than equi-
table benefits. Although the term "socially adequate benefits," like the term
"floor of protection," may be vague and mean different things to different
people,20 6 it is likely to include some degree of redistribution of income from
the higher-paid to the lower-paid20 7 and should be greater than the level of
benefits provided by SSI. 2 0 8
Private initiatives should then build on social security's "floor of protec-
tion" and may subject workers to some degree of investment risk. They
should focus on equity and promote the replacement of a significant percent-
age of pre-retirement earnings to avoid the disruption of lifestyle after retire-
203. See MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 5.
204. See Nancy J. Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A
Response to Professor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1419 (1987) (discussing how retirement system
elements developed in fragmented manner but should be analyzed and addressed collectively).
See generally Graetz, supra note 200 (contending that elements of national retirement system
should be considered together rather than analyzed independently and proposing reforms to
current system).
205. MYERS, supra note 2, at 231; see also BooTH, supra note 7, at xiv (stating social secur-
ity provides a "floor of protection through wage-related benefits on which the worker can build
additional security through savings, private pensions, home ownership, and other assets"); FER-
RARA, supra note 34, at 17 ("The legislative history of the act makes clear that the social security
program was intended to provide only a basic floor of income in old age, allowing individuals to
build further income protection through private alternatives if they desired."); Nancy J. Altman,
Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker
Security, 42 TAX L. REv. 433, 494 (1987) (stating since its inception, "social security has been
recognized as inadequate by itself to maintain the standard of living of any but the very poorest
recipients").
206. "[Floor of protection] does not say where to locate the floor, or, to borrow a metaphor
from Wilbur J. Cohen, whether the floor should be covered with quality carpeting. Far from
settling anything, this standard phrase was ambiguous in the extreme. 'Undoubtedly,' Cohen
once remarked, 'its great attractiveness and usefulness has been that it can mean different things
to different people. Its value is in what it conceals rather than what it reveals."' DERTHICK,
supra note 21, at 271.
207. Admittedly, social security does not do as good a job of redistributing income as a pure
welfare program might. See, e.g., FERRARA, supra note 34, passim. Nevertheless, I believe that
its sometimes inefficient redistribution may be outweighed by its ability to provide lower-income
workers with retirement benefits with dignity and its ability to promote the work efforts of
lower-income workers.
208. Social security benefits should exceed those provided by SSI to ensure that lower-
income workers are encouraged to work and not to rely on SSI for retirement benefits. Cf.
MYERS, supra note 2, at 805 (noting that real danger of SSI lies in its potential to discourage
people from participating in social security and private retirement measures if benefit level is
increased too substantially).
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ment. Finally, SSI should ensure that all individuals with spotty or weak
work histories have minimally adequate incomes in retirement.209
There is no doubt that social security's provision of "equity" played a
role in the political popularity of the program. 2 10 Expressly choosing social
adequacy over complete equity, however, need not be the downfall of social
security's political support. First, social security need not completely elimi-
nate "equity" as a concept. It can and should continue to provide defined
benefits based in part on earnings. Such a benefit formula can encourage
productive work as well as assist the program in adapting to regional differ-
ences in income and the cost of living.211
In addition, policymakers can further social security's political popular-
ity by promoting it in light of its role in our national retirement income sys-
tem. Policymakers may remind lower-income workers that social security
provides them with retirement benefits that exceed those provided by SS 1212
and that they have the right to accept the benefits with dignity because they
contributed to the system and earned the right to the benefits. 213
Policymakers may point out to middle and higher income workers that
without partial redistribution of their social security contributions, they
would probably have to pay more income taxes to support redistributions
through SSI because some earnings are likely to be redistributed whether
through social security or some other program. In fact, arguably less of their
money may be redistributed through social security because it forces lower-
income workers to share in the cost of their retirement benefits.21 4
In addition, higher-income workers may be reminded that they currently
receive more than their fair share of government largesse through the third
209. SSI is a social assistance program. It provides a guaranteed minimum income to the
low-income aged, blind, and disabled on a needs-tested basis and is funded through general
revenues. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 24, at 15 ("SSI, [not Social
Security,] is designed to ensure that the most impoverished of elderly, blind, and disabled are
brought up to a minimum standard of living."). See generally, MYERS, supra note 2, at 799-805
(discussing role of SSI, how payments are calculated, and how SSI helps to ensure some minimal
level of income).
210. See, e.g., MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 5 (discussing the "[cloncept that each worker
should receive at least as much in benefits as he had contributed was considered crucial to public
acceptance of a compulsory program").
211. DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 271-72.
212. As noted above, social security's "socially adequate benefits" should be greater than
those provided by SSI to reward lower-income workers' work efforts.
213. Cf. BROWN, supra note 27, at 104-05 (maintaining "[social security was intended] to lift
beneficiaries who have been regularly employed throughout life from the necessity of resorting
to needs-test assistance"); MUNNELL, supra note 34, at 85 (maintaining that contributory financ-
ing of social security allows workers to receive benefits as earned right rather than as a dole);
Cohen, supra note 11, at 5, 13 (stating social security "is a way of assuring the dignity and inde-
pendence of the individual, the integrity of the family, and the stability and purchasing power of
the community.").
214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text for a discussion of inefficient redistribution
of income.
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tier of our national retirement income system.2 15 Currently, our federal gov-
ernment provides substantially favorable tax treatment to employer-spon-
sored pension programs.2 16 Although restrictions are imposed on the
programs to encourage coverage of lower-income workers, plans still tend to
favor the highly-paid, and the tax benefits generally accrue to the benefit of
the highly-compensated. 2 17
Thus, in sum, the three tiers of our national retirement income security
system can and should perform distinct but rationally integrated roles in pro-
viding national retirement income security. SSI should serve as a safety net
to ensure that individuals with spotty or weak work histories have minimally
adequate incomes upon retirement. Social security should serve as floor of
protection to ensure that all workers have socially adequate benefits upon
retirement. Finally, voluntary private initiatives should supplement social se-
curity to provide for the replacement of a significant portion of the pre-re-
tirement earnings of individuals who participate in such programs. The
privatization proposals misconceive the role social security should play in our
national retirement system by requiring that all individuals participate in a
program that would promote the replacement of pre-retirement income
rather than the provision of socially adequate benefits.
CONCLUSION
Proposals to privatize social security are an increasingly popular solution
to social security's long-term funding problems. The proposals offer partici-
pants the opportunity to earn market rates of return, a facially appealing al-
ternative to the current system in today's seemingly endless bull market.
The proposals, however, are not a costless solution to social security's
problems. First, they do not guarantee participants that they will do better
than (or even as well as) they would under the current system. Rather, they
subject participants to investment risk. Participants might earn better rates
of return, or they might not. In addition, the privatization proposals would
impose transition costs as they convert the current predominantly pay-as-
you-go system to a funded system.
215. This is not to suggest that higher-income workers should continue to receive such a
large share of the governmental benefits accruing from the private sector tier of our national
retirement system. It simply recognizes that they currently do.
216. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that net exclusions for employer retire-
ment plan contributions and earnings will carry the highest cost of all federal tax expenditures
during the years 1998-2002. Specifically, the exclusions are estimated to cost $388.8 billion in
federal revenues during the years 1998-2002. JoIr COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES FOR
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1998-2002, at 26.
217. See generally Altman, supra note 205; Bankman, supra note 165 (discussing impact
which anti-discrimination provisions have on lower income employees and suggesting solutions
which more effectively achieve goal of providing retirement income to this group); Daniel I.
Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as
a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1 (1993).
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The proposals would also promote misguided paternalism. They would
require individuals to save for retirement without guaranteeing them any
particular return on their savings. Finally, the proposals misconceive the role
social security should play in our national retirement income security system.
They require that all individuals participate in a program that promotes the
replacement of pre-retirement income rather than the provision of socially
adequate benefits, a program that is better left to voluntary private
initiatives.
Social security faces serious problems, and there are no easy answers.
Although privatization may be facially appealing, it is not the solution to
social security's long-term funding difficulties.
